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LONGER VERSION*

THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
James G. Stewart & Asad Kiyani**
ABSTRACT
International criminal law (“ICL”) is legally plural, not a single unified
body of norms. As a whole, trials for international crimes involve a
complex dance between international and domestic criminal law, the
specificities of which vary markedly from one forum to the next. To date,
many excellent scholars have suggested that the resulting doctrinal
diversity in ICL should be tolerated and managed under the banner of
Legal Pluralism. To our minds, these scholars omit a piece of the puzzle
*
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American Journal of Comparative Law. This longer version includes a fourth part
focused on criminal law procedure. In this additional part, we set out the eclectic nature
of Argentine criminal procedure as a null hypothesis, since it shows evidence of a
congruence between criminal law doctrine and surrounding social values that acts as an
exception to the trend we identify in our other examples. We then qualify this Argentine
counterexample by discussing the history of employing divergent criminal procedure in
post-WWI trials to show instances when ICL must adopt a unified standard for functional
reasons. In this longer version, we also weave the insights from these two examples of
criminal procedure throughout the remainder of the piece.
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that has major implications for their theory – the law’s history. Neglecting
the historical context of the international and national criminal laws that
inform ICL leads to (a) the uncritical adoption of criminal law doctrine as
a proxy for diverse social, cultural and political values; and (b) in the
limited instances where criminal law doctrine does reflect underlying
societal values, an overly general assumption that respecting the various
embodiments of this law is best for ICL. These oversights result in
important normative distortions, with major implications for the field’s
self-image, function and legitimacy. In particular, scholars and courts
overlook that much criminal law doctrine globally is the result of either a
colonial imposition or an “unsuccessful” legal transplant, as well as
historical examples where respecting pre-existing doctrinal arrangements
undermined the value of postwar trials on any semi-defensible measure. In
this Article, we revisit a cross-section of this missing history to contribute
to both Legal Pluralism and ICL. For the former, we demonstrate that
there is nothing inherently good about Legal Pluralism, and that in some
instances, a shift from its descriptive origins into a more prescriptive form
risks condoning illegitimate or dysfunctional law. For ICL, our
historiography shows how partiality is embedded in the very substance of
ICL doctrine, beyond just the politics of its enforcement. At one level, this
realization opens up the possibility of renegotiating a universal ICL that,
at least in certain circumstances, is actually more plural in terms of
values and interests than doctrinal pluralism although the dangers of
power masquerading as universalism are also profound. At another, it
suggests that institutions capable of trying international crimes need to do
far more to step away from the ugly legal histories they have inherited.
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“[T]here is nothing inherently good, progressive, or emancipatory about
legal pluralism.”
Boaventura de Sousa Santos1
I. INTRODUCTION
International criminal law (“ICL”) is legally plural, not a single
unified body of norms. Trials for international crimes, like aggression,
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, take place in
international and domestic courts alike, and frequently involve a complex
interplay between international and domestic criminal law. This interplay,
which is largely improvised rather than choreographed, takes place on at
least five levels: (1) within national courts, trials involving international
crimes often employ their own local criminal law standards rather than the
international law equivalent;2 (2) international courts sometimes follow a
particular national system in interpreting ICL rules;3 (3) international
courts often survey then synthesize a wide selection of national rules to
demonstrate widespread support for their favored approach;4 (4) at times,
1

BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 89 (2002).
2
Rb.’s-Gravenhage 23 december 2005, LJN: AX6406, Docket no. 09/751003-04 (Van
Anraat), ¶¶ 6.5.1–6.6 (Neth.) (intriguingly, applying the standard of complicity in
customary international law but that contained in Dutch criminal law for war crimes). For
commentary on the case, see Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide v. War Crimes in the Van
Anraat Appeal, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 557 (2008). Sometimes, of course, the
international aspects of ICL operate to preclude the application of national criminal law
to war crimes. See in this regard, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan to
effectively strike down conspiracy as a war crime because it was not adequately
recognized in the history of ICL. Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 46 (2006)
(concluding that “international sources confirm that the crime charged here is not a
recognized violation of the law of war”).
3
The most conspicuous example of this phenomenon is probably the uptake of German
criminal law principles of attribution in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), in
sharp contrast with their explicit rejection at ad hoc tribunals beforehand. For a helpful
doctrinal synthesis of ICC case law governing (German) modes of attribution, see
WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE EXPERT REPORT, MODES OF LIABILITY: A
REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE AND
PRACTICE (2013), http://iccwomen.org/documents/Modes-of-Liability.pdf.
4
Surveys of national criminal law have featured in all international criminal tribunals and
courts to ascertain the scope of customary international law and guide hermeneutics. See,
for example, the survey of conspiracy standards in France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Japan, and Spain at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal).
16 R. JOHN PRITCHARD & SONIA MAGBANUA ZAIDE, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL 39,036–37 (1981); Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case
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international statutes, treaties and national legislation define the same ICL
concept differently,5 and finally, (5) judicial bodies that interpret ICL
occasionally disagree amongst themselves about the interpretation of the
same body of law.6 In combination, these improvised rather than
No. IT-05-87-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 1644–45 nn.5409–19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (undertaking a very substantial survey of criminal law
governing complicity in national law, including Mexico, India, Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, the United
States, England, and others); Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-A,
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 729 n.1680 (Dec. 14, 2011) (drawing on criminal law from a large
number of states, including Germany, Kenya, Lithuania, Costa Rica, and New Zealand,
to conclude that the desecration of a corpse “constituted a profound assault on human
dignity meriting unreserved condemnation under international law”). See also Prosecutor
v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 178 n.222 (Aug. 2, 2007)
(surveying the criminal law applicable in France, Italy, Argentina, Egypt, Bolivia, and
elsewhere to define the war crime of collective punishments). Interestingly, the ICC has
cited other surveys of national law undertaken in other international tribunals. See
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the
Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶ 29
(Nov. 30, 2007) (stating that “the practice of familiarizing witnesses with the courtroom
and the procedures which they will encounter . . . is documented in many national and
international contexts,” then citing surveys undertaken by the ICTY for support). These
comparative law surveys are also a powerful basis for dissent. See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on Victims’ Participation
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge René Blattmann, ¶ 26 n.13 (Jan. 18, 2008)
(drawing on criminal procedure in Germany, France, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Ireland, and
Canada to criticize the majority’s position on victim participation).
5
Crimes against humanity and genocide are prime examples. With respect to the former,
the Statutes of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
differs from that pertaining to its sibling the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
which differs again from that enacted in their cousin institution, the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”). For a thorough comparison of the development of these
principles, see CHRISTINE BYRON, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009). As for genocide,
national rules criminalizing the offense often extend the ambit of the crime beyond just
the four protected groups announced in the Genocide Convention itself. For an excellent
survey of examples, see WARD FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 23–29 (2006).
6
Sometimes, international statutes differ. Crimes against humanity, for instance, are
defined differently in at least three different international courts. In other circumstances,
international courts and tribunals reach contrary conclusions on questions of law that
their statutes leave unresolved. For example, the famed Tadić Judgment concluded that
an extended version of a concept called Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) was wellfounded in customary international law. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Appeals Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), ¶ 185–
229. Over a decade later, however, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) openly begged to differ. Ieng Sary et al., Case File No. 002-192007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges
Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), (10 May 2010), ¶ 83 (concluding that the
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choreographed dynamics make ICL a doctrinally plural normative interpenetration between multiple national and international systems of
criminal law, and not a unified singularity. The question is––Is the
resulting doctrinal diversity desirable for ICL?
Over the past decade, Legal Pluralism has emerged as a prominent
analytical lens that, with caveats, tends to answer in the affirmative.7 In
his ground-breaking work Global Legal Pluralism, for instance, Paul
Berman offers a balanced catalogue of the strengths and weaknesses of
universalism: the idea that we should fashion a more uniform single set of
international standards from the existing variety. Berman concludes that,
“there are reasons to question both the desirability and—more
importantly—the feasibility of universalism, at least in some contexts.”8
Chief among his objections is that “universalism inevitably erases
diversity.”9 Extrapolating this idea onto ICL, Alexander Greenawalt
eloquently argues that Legal Pluralism leads to the conclusion that “it is
not self-evident that international criminal law must take the form of a
uniform, all-encompassing body that trumps contrary domestic laws in
every instance”.10 Similarly, others have argued that even international
legal institutions need not pursue uniformity,11 and ultimately, that for ICL
Court “does not find that the authorities relied upon in Tadić… constitute a sufficiently
firm basis to conclude that JCE III formed part of customary international law”). These
contrasting interpretations can even involve three ways splits that include other
international institutions that apply public international law rather than criminal law per
se. The International Court of Justice, for instance, has adopted a definition of pillage that
is inconsistent with that announced in the ICC Elements of Crimes, and to compound
matters, the ICTY has adopted a third variant. JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR
CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19–23 (2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1875053.
7
See, in particular, PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal
Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 243 (2009); Sally Engle
Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); William Burke-White,
International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2003); Peer Zumbansen,
Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal
Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (2012).
8
Paul Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1191 (2007).
Consequently, Berman continues and offers a set of procedural mechanisms, institutional
designs and discursive practices for managing hybridity.
9
Id. at 1191. In fairness to Berman, he cites this as just one factor that might make
universalism undesirable, and rightly points to the fact that even if this is not the case in
discrete areas, managing hybrid/conflictual systems of law will be essential in periods of
transition to a universal standard, if one is feasible at all.
10
Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND.
L.J. 1063, 1069 (2011).
11
Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik, ‘Fragmentation’, Diversification and ‘3D’
Legal Pluralism: International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-Box?, in THE
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in particular, “[l]egal pluralism can even be regarded as an asset, a
strength.”12 While we believe that these views are valuable and of ongoing
importance, we add a perspective grounded in legal history.
Clearly, the desire to preserve cultural variety is a key aspiration
for prescriptive accounts of Legal Pluralism. We should let be the variety
of criminal laws governing, say, perpetration of international crimes in the
many legal systems of the world, not unify them in an objectionable act of
legal eugenics. The notion that legal variation reflects cultural variety has
a long pedigree. In the oft-cited words of Montesquieu, for example, laws
“should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are
framed, that it is a great chance if those of one nation suit another.”13
Isaiah Berlin, in turn, warns that “there is no single set of principles, no
universal truth for all men and times and places”, and that universalism
represents nothing more than a vain and destructive search for “the ideal
society.”14 For leading criminologists too, punishment “is necessarily
grounded in wider patterns of knowing, feeling, and acting, and it depends
upon the social roots and supports for its continuing legitimacy and

DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 21, 51
(Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik, eds., 2012) (arguing that “it might even be
acceptable that the ECtHR and the ICTR would come to different results and conclusions
in cases that display factual similarity, since both entities operate on the basis of different
mandates and legal frameworks”).
12
Elies van Sliedregt, Pluralism in International Criminal Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
847, 849 (2012). Admittedly, not all writings about legal pluralism in ICL follows this
line. We agree, for instance, with Maxime Clarke when she writes that “global legal
pluralism...must move beyond legal pluraism to attend to the complexities of power at
play and the ways that force and power cut through even pluralist constellations.”
KAMARI MAXINE CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (CAMBRIDGE
STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIETY) 118 (2009).
13
CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 23 (Thomas
Nugent (trans), Kitchener, Batoche 2001).
14
ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 224 (1992) (“If each culture
expresses its own vision and is entitled to do so, and if the goals and values of different
societies and ways of life are not commensurable, then it follows that there is no single
set of principles, no universal truth for all men and times and places. The values of one
civilization will be different from, and perhaps incompatible with, the values of another.
If free creation, spontaneous development along one’s own natives lines, not inhibited or
suppressed by the dogmatic pronouncements of an elite of self-appointed arbiters,
insensitive to history, is to be accorded supreme value; if authenticity and variety are not
to be sacrificed to authority, organization, centralization, which inexorably tend to
uniformity and the destruction of what men hold dearest — their language, their
institutions, their habits, their form of life, all that has made them what they are — then
the establishment of one world, organized on universally accepted rational principles —
the ideal society — is not acceptable.”).
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operation.”15 As a result, we read these scholars as urging us to embrace
the heterogeneity of criminal law doctrine that presently couples with and
informs international crimes out of respect for cultural diversity.
Thus, our priorities should shift to what private international
lawyers would call “choice of law,” where comity dictates that legal
systems pay due respect to one another’s legal doctrine by peaceably
resolving conflicts based on preordained second-order rules. Perhaps cases
involving international crimes occasioned in the Congo should involve
Congolese notions of complicity, whereas international crimes carried out
in the United States could draw on rules indigenous to that culture. When
Americans are complicit in atrocities in the Congo, we look to a second
set of standards at a higher level of abstraction to resolve the doctrinal
discord at the lower. All the while, Legal Pluralists tend to dismiss as
either culturally intolerant or politically impracticable what early
comparativists called un droit commun de l’humanité.16 Although
universalizing tendencies will often allow power to corrupt regulatory
schemes that are genuinely plural too, we cautiously take issue with the
supposition that Legal Pluralism is necessarily a better solution in every
instance. To do this, we use ICL as our subject and history as our
methodological foil.
Most fundamentally, we dispute the underlying assumption that
doctrine is necessarily a dependable measure of cultural diversity.17 This
is the assumption that seems to underpin much of the ‘pluralist’ work in
ICL, although most scholars who are part of the emerging debate we enter
into here are more considered in their pluralism. This is to be contrasted
with the ‘pluralism’ of international tribunals, which – as we demonstrate
below – repeatedly assert the universality of one particular norm or
another on the basis that it reappears in multiple domestic legal systems.
To our minds, entertaining this assumption of global criminal law
risks confirming Markus Dubber’s concern that “the study of comparative
15

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 21 (2002). See also Joachim Vogel, Why is the Harmonization
of penal law necessary? A Comment, in HARMONISATION AND HARMONISING MEASURES
IN CRIMINAL LAW 55, 55 (André Klip & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2002) (it “has
national and cultural roots and is part of the identity of a nation, its society and its
culture.”).
16
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 3
(1998). For contemporary comparative work that picks up on this theme, see MIREILLE
DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR
LEGAL PLURALISM (2007).
17
Others have made the law-culture connection more explicit. See, e.g., Sarah Harding,
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 411 (2003)
(“Legal systems reflect the cultures within which they are situated and thus have unique
and highly contingent identities”).
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criminal law can be oddly ahistorical.”18 What, for instance, of the
influence of colonialism on criminal doctrine throughout a large portion of
the world?19 Indeed, the very notion of Legal Pluralism first arose as a
means of describing the normative interplay between the system of law
forcibly imposed by colonial masters and the indigenous social order it
purported (often unsuccessfully) to displace.20 Surely the various criminal
law doctrines imposed during colonial rule would have no automatic claim
to reflecting societal values in the territories in which they still apply in; in
fact, one might suspect the opposite.21 Though there may be some places
and some histories in which cultural values have come to match these
transplanted criminal law doctrines––much like some formerly colonized
countries have adopted cricket as part of their national identity22––it is not
the case that this equivalence necessarily follows. In this respect, scholars
of ICL should be mindful of Martti Koskenniemi’s warning that one of the
dangers of reifying doctrinal pluralism is that “it ceases to pose demands
on the world.”23
To substantiate the point using ICL, we pair the history of four
doctrines in national criminal law with their international equivalents. We
divide the criminal doctrine we select by type. We focus first on
procedure, followed by inchoate crimes, forms of responsibility and
criminal offenses. As for national examples, we select examples from all
major colonial traditions: the Spanish influence over criminal procedure in
Argentina, the French influence (via Belgium) over the inchoate offense
of association de malfaiteurs in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
collective influence of European colonial powers that led Japan to absorb
German criminal doctrine governing modes of participating in crime like
complicity, and finally, the distorting character of English criminal law
18

Markus Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1287, 1291 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2008).
19
For a detailed history of the relationship between colonialism and law, see LAUREN A.
BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400 –
1900 (2010).
20
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 872 (1988)
(distinguishing “Classic Legal Pluralism”, which involved dual legal systems when
European countries superimposed their legal systems, from “New Legal Pluralism” that
has arisen since the 1970s in noncolonized societies).
21
On this point, discussing so-called ‘primitive legal systems’, see JEREMY WALDRON,
PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND 210 (2012) (“Anthropologists and
philosophers with a culturalist axe to grind sometimes exaggerate the self-contained
purity of these systems”).
22
We are grateful to Antony Anghie for the point.
23
Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007).
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governing the crime of blasphemy in Pakistan. For the international
counterpart, we seize upon similar doctrine at each major historical
interval of ICL: the procedure developed after WWI to try German war
criminals at Leipzig, the controversial adoption of conspiracy as an
inchoate offense at Nuremberg and Tokyo post-WWII, the rise of Joint
Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as a mode of participation at ad hoc tribunals in
the 1990s, and the failure to create a crime of colonialism or define
apartheid in a way that accorded with its natural meaning in the ICC
Statute, despite concerted attempts. The analysis produces a loose
typology of ways in which legal doctrine is not a reliable referent for
cultural diversity Legal Pluralism ought to champion.
In Part II, we commence by highlighting the exception to our thesis,
then a qualification of this exception. First, drawing on excellent work on
the progeny of Argentine criminal procedure, we show how this example
may personify Antony Anghie’s cricket metaphor—instances where
previously colonialized peoples embrace an alien introduction, shape it
and call it their own. We lead with this Argentine example since it creates
something of a null hypothesis for our subsequent case studies. In all the
other examples we explore, we very much doubt that the cricket metaphor
holds: the other examples we consider are not like criminal procedure in
Argentina. By beginning with the counterexample, however, we
emphasize that connections between popular values and criminal doctrine
in previously colonialized societies do sometimes exist; we simply express
great caution about making the assumption categorical and note that in
certain contexts it is unquestionably false. Second, we use the experience
with war crimes trials post-WWI to qualify our null hypothesis with one
additional observation—many international trials will involve political
and cultural values that transcend any one community. As we show, the
criminal procedure applicable in Leipzig after WWI was a key feature of
the trials’ alienating characteristics for relevant audiences in France,
Belgium and Britain. Thus, even if the German criminal procedure used at
Leipzig did reflect German values, it is not only these values that matter.
Together, our analyses of criminal law doctrine in Argentina and Leipzig
set the stage for all that follows.
In Part III, we discuss inchoate crimes in the DRC and post-WWII
tribunals to illustrate the first variant in our typology of how doctrine is
not a safe metric for value pluralism—criminal law is often part and parcel
of the violent repression ICL exists to counteract. This unfortunate reality
undermines doctrine’s credentials as a medium for expressing cultural
diversity worth preserving. It was, after all, criminal law doctrine in
national systems that allowed Joseph Stalin to sign 3,167 judicially-
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imposed death sentences in a single day,24 and Adolf Hitler to make being
Jewish a criminal offence.25 Undoubtedly, most contemporary criminal
law is not operating in a political climate remotely comparable to the Red
Terror or National Socialism, but like many aspects of extreme violence,
these episodes of frightening excess teach lessons that still resonate:
relying on a formalistic notion of law as a Polaroid image of cultural
values within the surrounding community is unsafe; sometimes law and
culture coincide, but the correspondence is hardly guaranteed or
dependable. Moreover, regardless of whether law represents widespread
local cultural values or not, the experience post WWI suggests that its
adequacy for ICL cannot be assumed. Our example of the inchoate offense
of association de malfaiteurs in the DRC evidences these realities very
concretely, and although conspiracy’s record in post-war tribunals is more
ambiguous, it too demonstrates points of continuity with an oppressive
style of criminal justice.
In Part IV, we discuss the transmission of European models of
blame attribution into Japanese criminal law in the nineteenth century and
into ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the twentieth. In our
typology’s second element, we observe how, even outside colonial
contexts, much criminal law doctrine is mass-produced far away rather
than tailored locally.26 The literature on legal transplants is voluminous,27
but somewhat strangely, it tends to focus on private law exclusively, even
though the criminal law undeniably ranks among the branches of law most
regularly uprooted then re-sown in foreign lands.28 The point is, for better
24

At a rate of more than one every two minutes. RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF
74 (2005). According to Vogler’s harrowing account, a single court
court tried and sentenced 551 individuals to death in October 1928 alone, contributing to
over a million judicially imposed executions over the period.
25
Id. at 85, (citing a letter from the Reich Minister of Justice stating that “[i]n criminal
proceedings against Jews the decisive fact is their Jewishness rather than their
culpability.”).
26
For an important exception in criminal procedure, see Máximo Langer, From Legal
Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004).
27
The locus classicus is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974). For an extremely impressive earlier work, that treated law
less specifically as a component of sociological imitation across cultures generally, see
GABRIEL DE TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Worthington Clews Parsons trans.,
Henry Holt & Co. 1903) (1895).
28
Those authors who do write on comparative criminal law frequently decry the failure
to consider criminal law as part of this process. See Elisabetta Grande, Comparative
Criminal Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 191, 191
(Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (calling comparative criminal law’s history “a
past of oblivion,” because of this lack of engagement within the wider comparative
project); Dubber, supra note 18, at 1288 (lamenting that “[t]extbooks on comparative law
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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or worse, scholars tend to agree that legal transplants of these sorts seldom
“work.” While there are important exceptions–and we argue that criminal
procedure in Argentina is one such example29–extensive empirical
analyses classify the bulk of legal transplants as “unreceptive,” meaning
that the recipient society is “unable to give meaning to the law.”30 If this is
true of German notions of complicity forcibly introduced into Japan or of
Anglo-American notions of JCE infused into ICL through ad hoc
tribunals, it would be bizarre (to say the least) for ICL courts and scholars
to ascribe meaning to a maladjusted foreign criminal law doctrine, when
affected populations in the recipient state cannot.
In Part V, we focus on the criminal offense of blasphemy in
Pakistan, which is actually a relic of criminal laws first introduced by the
English, after which we consider failed attempts at making colonialism
and apartheid crimes in the ICC Statute. These examples present the third
variant of our typology. As Günther Teubner has famously argued, legal
transplants are often better described as “legal irritants,”31 given that they
are “not transplanted into another organism, rather [they work] as a
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and
unexpected events.”32 By extension, we argue that the Islamization of
British criminal law in Pakistan, and in particular the crime of blasphemy,
is one example of an irritant that spawns unintended and unwelcome
downstream consequences. Originally intended to manage inter-religious
conflict, blasphemy instead became a tool for cruelly exploiting that
tension. We pair Pakistan’s experience of blasphemy with attempts to
criminalize colonialism and apartheid in the Rome Statute of the ICC.
That process largely inverts the Pakistani experience. Whereas the
criminalization of blasphemy was fuelled by the colonial domination of
the Indian subcontinent, the criminalization of colonialism, apartheid and
other conduct was arguably suppressed by Western domination of
international lawmaking. As a result, we use blasphemy to caution, first,
against ICL bowing to transplanted domestic criminal law doctrine that is
an outright nuisance locally. Doing so may not only fail to add meaningful
diversity, it may also add insult to injury. Second, we highlight how the
demands for pluralism in ICL bely the neo-colonial reality of a lawmaking

feel no need to address, or even acknowledge the existence of, comparative studies in
criminal law.”).
29
See Part II.A, infra.
30
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 179 (2003).
31
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
32
Id. at 12.
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system where “legal irritants” are redefined as norms that would expose
powerful states representatives to criminal liability.
Finally, although constraints on length have precluded including
an illustration of the fifth and final element of our typology, in our view,
an unconditional deference to criminal doctrine in Global Legal Pluralism
would unjustifiably marginalize alternative systems of social ordering. As
previously mentioned, Legal Pluralism was initially purely descriptive,
attempting to plot the interactions between displaced social orders and
formal colonial law.33 To the extent that it took on a normative bent, this
largely grew out of challenges to methodology; i.e. objections to what
should figure as “law” within the wider sociological inquiry. Having
understandably dispensed with state-sanctioned law’s claims to a
monopoly over law, early adherents of Pluralism looked to a wider array
of social mores.34 As Brian Tamanaha intimates, this certainly raises
thorny questions about what might count as “law”,35 but even if no
completely satisfying answer to that question is ever forthcoming, the very
existence of the debate delivers a powerful blow to doctrinal pluralism
within a global polity: an over-emphasis on domestic criminal doctrine is
anathema to true pluralism, whose very program involves looking beyond
positivistic state-centered law. Although we do not develop a case study to
emphasize the point here, it also militates against equating doctrine with
the popular values that should really matter to a normative account of
Legal Pluralism.
We remain alive to the critique that what we target here is not in
real Legal Pluralism, but a simulacrum that focuses on state law alone.36
Yet we remain wary of the relative absence of historical attention in this
doctrinal pluralism, and of its prescriptive standpoint that posits Legal
Pluralism as the solution to a variety of ills facing ICL. We are skeptical
that Legal Pluralism has the tools to adjudicate between local norms and
legal doctrine in a choice-of-law modality or to decipher what norms are
optimal in disputes across communities, even if it does appreciate the
33

William Twining calls this mode of Legal Pluralism “Social Fact Legal Pluralism.” We
agree with him that “there is a tendency in the literature to slide from the descriptive to
the prescriptive.” William Twining, Legal Pluralism 101, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 112, 121 (Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Caroline Sage, & Michael Woolcock eds., 2012). Our concern is only with
this prescriptive aspect of the discourse.
34
As Tamanaha puts it, “[l]aw characteristically claims to rule whatever it addresses, but
the fact of legal pluralism challenges this claim.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding
Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 375 (2008).
35
Id.
36
As articulated to us variously by Doug Harris, Sarah Nouwen, and Alexander
Greenawalt.

2017]

THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM

14

socio-historical significance of the norms in any one polity. Moreover,
while we agree that doctrinal pluralism is problematic for the reasons we
explain, we also recognize the inevitability of the reliance on foreign
domestic criminal law by international lawyers and institutions. It is, after
all, readily available and clearly law. True, an alternative proposition
might be to simply focus on local values and not local laws, but while
appealing because of its democratic ethos, it becomes unclear what work
Legal Pluralism does in this program. Finally, though we posit the
possibility of a universalist ICL in certain circumstances, we also
recognize the utility of alternative, non-legal responses to international
crime. Our desire to pluralize ICL should not be read as excluding what
Mark Drumbl identifies as a pluralism of response,37 especially those that
do not rely on the criminal law we explore here.
Thus, we view our primary contribution as involving Legal
Pluralism itself, but we also conclude by highlighting the great
significance of this history for ICL, too. First, our analysis provides a
concrete illustration of Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s famous (but
abstract) statement “there is nothing inherently good, progressive, or
emancipatory about Legal Pluralism.”38 Second, we show that ICL’s
partiality does not just manifest at the level of enforcement, it is more
deeply embedded in the very substance of ICL norms themselves. Third,
once the false equivalence between criminal law doctrine and pluralism is
acknowledged and withdrawn, it clears the ground for pluralism by
unification. Might it not be possible for a unified system of law governing
ICL to promote a genuine plurality of values?39 Why, in other words, limit
our gaze to existing laws (even broadly defined) as objects for protection,
when a wide variety of scholars accept that diversity of cultural values and

37

Mark Drumbl, The Curious Criminality of Mass Atrocity: Diverse Actors, Multiple
Truths, and Plural Responses, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 68, 101
– 102 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev, eds., 2014).
38
Supra note 1.
39
In the context of women’s rights, for instance, Martha Nussbaum has offered a
compelling marriage of pluralism within a universal philosophical construct. See
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 60 (1st Edition ed. 2001) (“We have some good reasons already, then, to
think than universal values are not just acceptable, but badly needed, if we really are to
show respect for all citizens in a pluralistic society.” For other qualified defenses of
universalism, see also Ralf Michaels, “One Size Can Fit All” - On the Mass Production
of Legal Transplants, in ORDER FROM TRANSFER: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND LEGAL CULTURE Forthcoming (2013); MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY,
TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR LEGAL PLURALISM
(2007). We anticipate the possibility of something similar for ICL, although in which
aspects and how is beyond the scope of this research.
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political interests are our real concern?40 For instance, referring to the
“universal structure of criminal law” as an “antidote” to the sorts of
positivist arguments that reify domestic criminal law doctrine, George
Fletcher writes that “resolutions on the surface of the law should not
obscure the unity that underlies apparently diverse legal cultures.”41
Although we do not suggest the aspects of the field where this unity might
be meaningful, the content of unified norms or the methods for
implementing them,42 we do test apparently diverse legal cultures in the
hope of opening up greater space for the idea that a single universal norm
may enjoy stronger credentials in (value) pluralism than the variety of
standards in existing doctrine. Obviously, universalism poses enormous
difficulties for Third World States, but we intend to show how Legal
Pluralism is no immediate solution to these difficulties and how, in
prescribed circumstances, universal norms have explored potential as
vehicles for value pluralism. Fourth, recognition of the histories of
coercion and suppression that are woven throughout our analysis suggests
that ICL institutions and practitioners have a real moral obligation to
redirect their energies towards enforcing international criminal law in
ways that better address Third World interests, as a collective
responsibility for the past.

40

See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166, 216 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (“Pluralism, with the measure of
‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal…because it
does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of them
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another”); ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN
THE AGE OF PLURALISM 49 (2007) (also referring to “value pluralism” as the core
objective); JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM 210 (1993) (same); and
Emmanuel Melissaris, The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism, 13 SOC.
& LEG. STUD. 57, 72 (2004) (same).
41
GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998).
42
One of us has suggested that forms of participation might be one site where this
universalism is both achievable and appropriate. See James G. Stewart, Ten Reasons for
Adopting a Universal Concept of Participation in Atrocity, in PLURALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Elies Van Sliedregt & Vasiliev eds., 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343392. Several other scholars acknowledge that some degree
of harmonization may be desirable in certain areas of ICL. See Van Sliedregt, supra note
12, at 852 (“Accepting pluralism at national level does not disqualify the need for a
general part at the international level.”). While aware of the risks of large-scale
standardization (see, e.g. Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent Objections, 60
U. TORONTO L.J. 537, 541 (2010) (“In short, therefore, the main objections to
universalistic legal theories are that they cannot accommodate variations across societies
in either conceptions of development or the presence of substitutes or complements for
the components of the legal system upon which they focus”), some harmonization in
certain areas of ICL can offer benefits.
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II. PROCEDURE
Our goal is not to show that legal systems never reflect local
values. That claim is not necessary for our argument, and indeed, it would
be the inverse of the categorical assumption we resist throughout the
Article. While the legal pluralist arguments we reference sometimes
appear to assume that legal and cultural values parallel one another, our
position is that any such correspondence is coincidental and unpredictable,
not automatic. In this Part, we develop an example where there does
appear to be strong evidence of a national criminal law that is the product
of deliberate, voluntary, local design, despite a history of colonial
imposition at its founding. In particular, the history of the unique and
eclectic brand of criminal procedure developed in Argentina post Spanish
colonialism points to an active, ongoing and conscious process of
deliberate legal redesign. Thus, Argentine criminal procedure operates as
a null hypothesis for the remainder of the article; we argue that almost
none of our other examples demonstrate this same degree of independent
local consent in the various criminal doctrines we explore. Put differently,
Argentine criminal procedure acts as the exception that establishes the
rule. Having discussed our paradigm case of local assumption then
modification of a (Spanish) colonial inheritance, we immediately
problematize even this ideal type as a model for ICL by assessing the role
of criminal procedure in war crimes trials post WWI. In this our example
from ICL, we show how doctrine that only reflects the political or cultural
values of a single polity can often lead to what French statesman Aristide
Briand once called “a parody of justice.”43 At times, ICL needs to speak
one unified language across polities, suggesting the need for unified
standards.
A.

Procedural Eclecticism in Argentina

While the bulk of this paper examines legal transplants that are are
coercive in nature, or legal translations that claim pluralist credentials in
spite of the narrow range of sources on which they draw, not all legal
translations need be problematic in this manner. The adaptation of
Argentine criminal procedure is an example of a deliberate reshaping of
colonially-imposed law into one that better reflects the values and
priorities of the local population. That system is and was the subjugated
recipient of legal rules and norms; a dissatisfied editor of the same; a
political instrument for military and democratic rulers alike; a legal
43

JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 136 (1st edition ed. 1982).
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innovator; and ultimately a normative exporter as well. The deliberate and
inclusive ethos that has guided the evolution of criminal procedure in
Argentina in a way that hints at the possibilities of a meaningful legal
pluralist approach to criminal law.
As a colony, Argentina had Spanish criminal law impressed upon it.
Criminal procedure in Argentina originally took the inquisitorial form
found throughout the Spanish colonies,44 which was included in the
compendious Spanish code Las Siete Partidas (“The Seven Parts”). As
with other colonial transpositions, Spanish criminal procedure was
formalized in a voluminous code cultivated from numerous regional,
religious and cultural sources, including the ecclesiastical laws of the
Catholic Church, local custom, regional sources and Spanish kingdoms,
previous attempts at codification, Justinian’s Roman code, the Moors, the
Visigoths, and Italian scholarship.45 Spanish criminal law and proceure
was, however, in a state of flux. Spain itself moved from a more open,
accusatorial-style system in the 12th century to a more private, secret
inquisitorial process that was formalized through Las Siete Partidas in the
14th century.46 It was precisely this reformulated inquisitorial model that
was later imposed on the Spanish colonies.47 By this process, Spanish
criminal procedure served as the template upon which modern Argentine
criminal procedure would be cast.
This Spanish procedural regime persisted in Argentina until
independence in 1816 sparked a long series of legal and political shifts.48
After experimentation with several constitutions, independent Argentina
approved a model explicitly based on the United States’ Constitution in
1853,49 on the basis that, unlike continental European models, the
American text offered procedural guarantees and restraints on political
excess through the separation of powers. This shift had profound impacts
on the redevelopment of procedural criminal law by eventually granting
44

OSVALDO BARRENECHE, CRIME AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN BUENOS
AIRES, 1785 – 1853, 10–11 (2006).
45
Helen Clagett, Las Siete Partidas, 22 Q. J. LIBR. CONGRESS 341, 342 (1965). The
codification process was started by King Alfonso X of Spain in the late 13th century; The
King was carrying on a project started by his father. Charles Sumner Lobingier, Las
Sietes Paratidas and its Predecessors, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488–89 (1912 − 1913).
46
Barreneche, supra note 44.
47
A Royal Decree in 1530 confirmed the applicability of domestic Spanish law in
Spanish colonies. Lobingier, supra note 44, at 491–92.
48
With the addition of special legislation developed to account for the presence of
indigenous peoples in the Spanish colonies in the Americas. See Clagett, supra note 44.
49
REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES 30 (2004)
(According to one delegate at the constitutional convention, “[The Argentine
Constitution] is modeled on that of the United States, the only federation in the world
which is worthy of being copied”).
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Argentine provinces the ability to develop their own procedural codes,
which led to a highly influential and drastically different code in one
province, and ultimately much of Latin America.
Yet this constitutional shift was far from concrete,50 and did not
automatically lead to a comparably profound shift in criminal procedure.
Faced with the option of fully investing in an American-type accusatorial
model and jury trials,51 Argentine élites recommitted to the familiarity of
the colonial criminal regime they had inherited in ways vaguely
comparable to the adoption of cricket as a national pastime on the Indian
subcontinent.52 As with much of Latin America, Argentina “stayed bound
to the pure inquisitorial system in a form almost identical to that which the
colonial administrations had employed”,53 even as the texts of criminal
procedure were routinely challenged and revised. When the first code of
criminal procedure was adopted in 1887, there were immediate complaints
that it was outdated,54 leading to a half-dozen revisions55 and ultimately a
compromise code in 1921 that drew from all of its predecessors.56 The
tension inscribed in these moves replicated itself through the oscillation of
50

Yet, as Robert Barros notes, these guarantees were far from impermeable: “Military
dictatorships deconstitutionalized the country, collapsing the separation of powers and
centralizing executive and legislative authority within the military leadership”. Robert
Barros, Courts out of Context: Authoritarian Sources of Judicial Failure in Chile (1973 –
1990) and Argentina (1976 – 1983), in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 156, 164 (Tom Ginsburg, ed., 2008).
51
Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 627 (2007).
52
KRISTIN RUGGERIO, MODERNITY IN THE FLESH: MEDICINE, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN
TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY ARGENTINA 189 (2004), (“In spite of the criticism of Argentine
judicial practices, congressional opposition to the jury system remained firm. The
opposition was mainly based on a lack of confidence in Argentine character and level of
civilization”). See also Langer, supra note 51, at 628, citing Andres D’Alessio, The
Function of the Prosecution in the Transition to Democracy in Latin America, in
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P
Stotzky, ed., 1993), and James L. Bischoff, Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in
Latin America, (2003) 9 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 27, 34 – 35 (that the uneducated classes
could not be trusted to make decisions).
53
Bischoff, supra note 52, at 34.
54
Marcelo Ferrante, Argentina, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 12,
13 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus Dubber, eds., 2011).
55
Taking place in less than 35 years. JULIA RODRIGUEZ, CIVILIZING ARGENTINA:
SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND THE MODERN STATE 203 (2006). These revisions were based
on at least four separate northern European penal codes - Germany, Austria, Sweden, and
Switzerland. See Edmund H Schwenk, Criminal Codification and General Principles of
Criminal Law in Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and the United States: A Comparative Study,
4 LA . L. REV. 351, n1 (1941 − 1942). But see Ferrante, supra note 54 (arguing that the
most influential code was actually the Italian Criminal Code of 1889).
56
Ferrante, supra note 54.
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Argentina’s political and legal systems between asserting strong
individual due process rights and democratic governance, and military rule
and the manipulation of existing legal structures to serve repressive or
self-interested ends.57 Local political debate and contestation animated
legal development that, we say, ultimately exhibited a degree of
congruence between criminal law doctrine and underlying values.
As this conservative-liberal undulation took place at the macro level of
Argentine governance, the local contestation led to modernization at the
provincial level. The new constitutional structure may not have guaranteed
the due process rights that many reformers wanted, but it led to a national
criminal code, a national procedural code for certain cases, and – crucially
– allowed each of Argentina’s 23 provinces to develop their own
procedural code to be applied in respect of the bulk of criminal offences.58
From this new and eclectic division of powers arose the Córdoba criminal
procedure code of 1939, which embodied a more progressive liberal spirit
that quickly diffused throughout the country.59 Drawing heavily from
Italian criminal procedure, the Córdoba code began a substantive shift
away from the Spanish inquisitorial model through the implementation of
due process rights more familiar to common-law systems.60 Important
changes included making criminal trials public and oral, granting more
rights to defendants, and expediting the criminal justice process by
allowing prosecutors (instead of judges) to lead investigations of less
serious offences.61 These parallel political processes combined to
transform Argentina’s colonial inheritance: the reframing of the national
constitution and a turn towards a new separation of powers, along with the
subsequent reimagining of criminal procedure law at the provincial level
out of an internally driven restructuring that we argue does not occur
frequently elsewhere.
57

See Barros, supra note 50, at 164 – 165 (military dictatorships concentrated political
power, but also employed constitutionally recognized emergency powers as political
instruments); GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS
AND PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA 153 (2012) (arguing that judges under the post-military
democracy devoted their lives’ work to arguing for the protection of human rights, but
then limited the scope of the trials prosecuting former military leaders); and Gastón
Gordillo and Silvia Hirsch, “Indigenous Struggles and Contested Identities in Argentina:
Histories of Invisibilization and Reemergence” (2003) 8:3 The Journal of Latin American
Anthropology 4 (that the various post-independence constitutions of Argentina helped
erase indigenous peoples from public consciousness in Argentina).
58
AYA GRUBER, VICENTE DE PALACIOS & PIET HEIN VAN KEMPEN, PRACTICAL GLOBAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22 (2012).
59
Between 1941 and 1971, 12 (of 23) provinces adopted the Cordoba Code. Langer,
supra note 51, at 634–36.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 634–35.
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The Córdoba Code of 1939 and its successors became the
progressive vanguard for Argentina. After the fall of military rule in 1983,
legal scholars revised national criminal procedure again.62 Unsurprisingly,
the model was found in Córdoba; Julio Maier, the author of the new
national code had studied under Sebastian Soler, the drafter of the
Córdoba code. Maier was tasked with reforming the federal Argentine
procedural code, and in 1986 produced a draft that drew alternately on
both German criminal procedure and the Córdoba code.63 Extensive public
debate in and out of Congress followed, and the new federal code of 1991
eventually drew on many of these concepts.64 Maier’s 1986 draft also
became the basis for an updated Córdoba code, completing the normative
circle. 65 Local scholars believed that the resulting code was imbued with
an important degree of popular assent—one described the new procedural
regime as “everything we might ask for in a modern and democratic code
of criminal procedure.”66
If Córdoba was both a synthesis of Argentine society writ large as well
as “a model for the administration of justice”,67 its influence was not
confined to national legal debates. Rather, the Córdoba code became the
harbinger for criminal procedure reform throughout much of Latin
America. Just as Argentina’s initial lurch towards a more progressive
constitution did not immediately herald a similar liberal inclination in
criminal procedure, so too did Latin American criminal procedure

62

See Gregory W. O’Reilly, Opening Up Argentina’s Courts, 80 JUDICATURE 237, 239
(1997).
63
This draft introduced five major reforms: open trials in a mixed court of lay people and
judges; granting accused the right to know the charges and evidence against them, to
have an attorney, to gather evidence, and to seek pre-interrogation legal advice; the
elimination of automatic pretrial detention; transferring pre-trial investigation to the
prosecutor, not judges; and mechanisms for avoiding the compulsory prosecution of all
crimes. Elements of this draft were built into the national criminal procedure code in
1992. Langer, supra note 51, at 638—640.
64
Id. at 641.
65
Córdoba was an ‘early innovator’, implementing oral and public trials, excluding
coerced confessions and derivative evidence, and establishing an adversarial system
While the 1994 constitutional reforms are hailed for institutionalizing international due
process norms as part of the country’s constitutional law, the Córdoba codes had already
included a number of those same guarantees in 1987, although the provinces of San Juan
and Neuquén had done so earlier. A.M HERNÁNDEZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
ARGENTINA 17 (2014).
66
DANIEL M. BRINKES, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN LATIN
AMERICA: INEQUALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 207 – 208 (2008).
67
María Inés Bergoglio, Argentina: The Effects of Democratic Institutionalization, in
LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE
20, 28 (Lawrence Friedman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, eds., 2003).
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generally continue “a much more archaic dynamic than that of Europe”,68
such that many of the worst abuses had continued even after the facial
modernization of criminal procedure.69 Those rule changes required (and
continue to demand) an attendant cultural shift in the tradition and
behavior of justice system actors,70 including politicians and judges,71 as
well as public pressure for meaningful reform.72 Here, the changes in
criminal procedure exhibited a an important degree of democratic
legitimacy that resonated beyond Argentina.
Thus, the adoption of an Argentine accusatorial model that formally
offers greater guarantees for individual rights, upended the historical stasis
of criminal procedure and led to common reforms throughout Latin
America.73 As Bischoff writes, “[t]he considerable similarity among Latin
America's new codes is no coincidence. The region's legislatures have
garnered their inspiration from the Model Code of Criminal Procedure for
Ibero-America of 1988, itself the modern incarnation of the seminal
Córdoba (Argentina) Code of 1939.”74 In Guatemala,75 Chile,76 and

68

Bischoff, supra note 52, at 34.
See generally Bischoff, supra note 52 (identifying the concentration of decisionmaking in the investigative phase of inquisitorial proceedings and the relegation of the
oral trial to a formality as the central problem).
70
Alfredo Fuentes-Hernández, Globalization and Legal Education in Latin America:
Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV 39, 45
(2002- 2003) (“Aside from formal rules and written Codes, there are informal restrictions
deeply entrenched in traditions, the culture of lawyers, and corporate behavioral patterns,
which generate perverse incentives and deter individuals from implementing changes of
routine”).
71
Carlos Menem’s expansion of the Supreme Court from five to nine judges was widely
recognized as means of ensuring the court - now stacked with judges who owed their
positions and loyalty to Menem - would rubber-stamp instead of contesting the acts of
the executive branch. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 865 (2003). This leads, however, to an incentive for judges to rule
against the government that appointed them so that future government keeps judges in
their posts.
72
Mario Di Paolantonio, Tracking the Transitional Demand for Legal Recall: The
Foreclosing and Promise of Law in Argentina, 13 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 351(2004)
(describing the “social demand” for legal reform, including the overturning of national
amnesty laws that precluded prosecutions for a wide range of offences committed by
military officers during the juntas). HELMKE, supra note 58, at 154.
73
Pablo Ciocchini, Campaigning to eradicate court delay: power shifts and new
governance in criminal justice in Argentina, 61 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 61, 63.
74
Bischoff, supra note 52, at 42.
75
Steven E. Hendrix, “Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala’s
Conversion to the Adversarial System” (1998) 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 365, 387
(Guatemala’s far-reaching changes from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system were
69
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elsewhere,77 Argentine and by extension Córdoban criminal procedure
came to predominate.78
This ongoing history of procedural development shows that not only
was Argentina a norm exporter in relation to international criminal law
and transitional justice solutions, it was and continues to be profoundly
influential in the development of a uniquely Argentine brand of criminal
procedure that has spread across the continent. This dual history of
international and domestic development undermines the assumption “that
such diffusion is more likely to flow from wealthier and more powerful
countries to less powerful countries.”79 Finally, while there may never be
a perfectly “organic connection of law with the being and character of the
people”,80 the particular history of criminal procedure we have traced
suggests this correspondence is difficult but not impossible. The reformers
drew on experiences and norms developed externally, but “chose to adapt
only those ideas that they felt best met the needs of Latin America’s social
and political reality”.81 In Argentina, these changes were rooted in the
drafted by Argentine jurists and were based on a new bill of Criminal Procedure awaiting
approval in Argentina).
76
Alberto Binder and Julio Maier, the architect of the Argentine national criminal
procedure code, and the student of Sebastian Soler, were key influences of criminal
procedure legal reform in Chile. Daniel Palacios Muñoz, Criminal Procedure Reform in
Chile: New Agents and the Restructuring of a Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 112, 117 – 119 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, eds.,
2011).
77
Christian Riego, The Chilean Criminal Procedure Reform, 26 INT’L J. SOC. L. 437, 438
(1998) (“The model used for the reform and the main ideas come from other Latin
American experiences, especially from that of Argentina which has developed much of
the Model Code for Iberoamerica, on which most of the above reforms are based”).
78
The authors of the 1986 draft Argentine federal criminal procedure code collaborated
with activists in other countries to create a dynamic regional and international network of
reformers revising criminal procedure codes throughout Latin America. A “Southern
activist expert network” brought together at least 19 different groups and agencies
throughout the Americas as part of the reformist group. See Richard J. Wilson,
Supporting or Thwarting the Revolution? The Inter-American Human Rights System and
Criminal Procedure Reform in Latin America, 14 SW. J. L. & TRADE IN THE AMERICAS
287, 290 (2008), and Langer, supra note 51, at 652−56.
79
Kathryn Sikkink, “From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle
for International Human Rights” 50 LAT. AM. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 1 – 2, 16 – 17 (2008).
80
FREDERICK KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION
AND JURISPRUDENCE 18 (Abraham Haywards, trans., 1999).
81
See Langer, supra note 51, at 668, and Máximo Sozzo, Cultural travels and crime
prevention in Argentina, in TRAVELS OF THE CRIMINAL QUESTION: CULTURAL
EMBEDDEDNESS AND DIFFUSION 185, 210 (Dario Melossi, Máximo Sozzo, and Richard
Sparks, eds., 2011) (“local actors have made use of the culturally imported devices to
face the numerous problems in their local contexts, generating cultural objects ‘here’,
through their political and theoretical inventiveness”).
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evolving political contexts of the post-colonial state, one where suspicions
of the illegitimacy of authority – because of their exclusionary violence –
were largely overcome.82 Here, deliberate and considered local
participation and action that continues to this day83 has reshaped colonial
inheritances and legal transplants into a local legal code that exhibits the
hallmark of the local assent that is too often missing in analyses of global
criminal law.
B.

Procedural Conflict in War Crimes Trials After WWI

The history of ICL unjustifiably fixates on Nuremberg as the field’s
point of origin, but this focus underappreciates earlier periods that laid the
foundation for what historian Mark Lewis memorably calls “the new
justice.”84 Surprisingly, there were literally thousands of war crimes trials
after WWI. Between 1921 and 1927, for instance, the Reich Court at
Leipzig opened some 1,700 investigations into German war crimes carried
out during the Great War.85 Likewise, in France and Belgium, “by
December 1924 more than twelve hundred Germans had been
condemned.”86 Importantly, the criminal law procedure employed in these
trials was, like Argentina, native to the national system and highly
divergent from surrounding systems, but it was also often alien to foreign
audiences, which proved to be a major factor in the abysmal failure of the
trials by any normative measure. Thus, we use this history to qualify
lessons from our Argentine example, showing how doctrinal pluralism
may not be optimal for ICL when criminal doctrine in a single jurisdiction
must speak cross-culturally. Even when criminal doctrine is a safe proxy
for social and cultural values within the community it governs, as is
82

Martin Böhmer, An Oresteia for Argentina: Between Fraternity and the Rule of Law,
in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 89, 115 – 117 (H. Jefferson Powell &
James Boyd White, eds., 2009).
83
Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Argentina: Reform of Code of Criminal Procedure,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR, (Dec. 16, 2014), available at
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404230_text.
84
MARK LEWIS, THE BIRTH OF THE NEW JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT, 1919-1950 (OUP Oxford, 1 edition ed. 2014).
85
GERD HANKEL, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: GERMAN WAR CRIMES AND THEIR LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES AFTER WORLD WAR I 6 (2014). The Reich Court and Prosecutor dealt
with hundreds of trials, but only 17 resulted in oral hearings. Id. at 65. For a helpful
breakdown of all the allegations by charge, see JOHN HORNE & ALAN KRAMER, GERMAN
ATROCITIES 1914: A HISTORY OF DENIAL 342–343 (1st edition ed. 2001).
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JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 142 (Greenwood Pub Group, 1st
edition ed. 1982).
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evident from our Argentine example, this fact alone is not a sufficient
condition for privileging it in a contest between normative orders.
The lead up to trials post-WWI is a matter of enormous intrigue,87
commencing with wartime warnings that paralleled those issued from
London during WWII, such as a notice issued by the French government
on 5 October 1918 declaring that “acts so contrary to International law,
and to the very principles of human civilization, should not go
unpunished.”88 Indeed, in contrast with his more famous posture after
WWII, where he called for summary executions of Nazis, Winston
Churchill was a staunch advocate of criminal prosecutions in the aftermath
of WWI.89 In this punitive spirit, the Treaty of Versailles initially included
a provision requiring the extradition of German war criminals to their
victors. In the words of Clemenceau, “no victory could justify an amnesty
for so many crimes.”90 A month later, the Allies requested the extradition
of nine hundred Germans pursuant to this provision and sought to
establish an international tribunal to punish Wilhelm II, all “as deterrent to
those who might at some time in the future be tempted to follow their
example.”91
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Several scholars have offered insightful overviews of these politics. See in particular,
Jürgen Matthäus, The Lessons of Leipzig: Punishing German War Criminals after the
First World War, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS
OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 3–23 (Patricia Heberer & Jürgen Matthäus eds., 2008);
GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE : THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS (2002); WILLIS, supra note 42; HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 85; Gerd
Hankel offers by far the most detailed historical account of the politics behind and within
the Leipzig trials. See HANKEL, supra note 85. Mark Lewis’ excellent book describes the
international politics best. See LEWIS, supra note 87, at 1-77.
88
CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS’ TRIALS
AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 5 (1921). General von Lüttwitz, who controlled
Berlin at the time, reported that if the government accepted extradiction, there was an
“urgent danger… that the officer corps would mutiny.” HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note
85 at 329. Evidently, the government was prepared to countenance this possibility by
adopting a “policy of catastrophe,” whereby its collapse provoked revolution in Allied
countries too who had no appetite for a return to war, bringing down the enemy with it to.
Id. at 335.
89
Hankel cites Churchill as declaring that “individuals against whom definitive breaches
of the laws of war and humanity can be brought, particularly those who have been guilty
of cruelty to helpless prisoners, must be brought to trial, and if convicted must be
punished as they deserve, no matter how highly placed”. HANKEL, supra note 85, at 14,
citing “Germany Must Pay” in James (ed), Winston D. Churchill, p. 2645.
90
HANKEL, supra note 85, at 15.
91
HANKEL, supra note 85, at 20. As Lewis explains, however, the aspirations for postwar
trials were varied and not always liberal, meaning that unsurprisingly, noble aspirations
for deterrence were not the only rationales for the new justice even if they were
important. See LEWIS, supra note 87, at 28-29.
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Politically, the request was a bridge too far. The Allies were forced
to back down from their demands for extradition when it became apparent
that doing otherwise may lead to a mutiny within the German army that
would topple the government,92 thereby further destabilizing a decimated
Europe. The resulting political stand-off over the vexed question of
accountability for “war guilt” was extraordinary. As Horne and Kramer
observe “it is remarkable that a democratic government of the Republic
[of Germany], which was prepared to accept a treaty that imposed severe
territorial and economic restrictions, limited the army to 100,000 men, and
banned conscription, should run the risk of collapse of the peace and
invasion over accusations of criminal acts against the old regime.”93
Nevertheless, this is exactly what transpired. But with little domestic
appetite for a return to what English war poet Siegfried Sassoon called
“flickering horror”,94 the Allies agreed to an obviously fraught
compromise: vanquished’s justice.95 Germany would try her own war
criminals.
As a result of this compromise, on 18 December 1919, the German
National Assembly adopted legislation incorporating international law on
war crimes into German criminal law and conferring a federal court in
Leipzig with extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute the offenses.96 The
Allies were understandably apprehensive; in a move later emulated by the
drafters of the permanent International Criminal Court, they formally
reserved to themselves the right to reassert jurisdiction if the trials
proposed in light of this legislation proved to be “exclusively aimed at
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For various views about whether the prospect of revolution in Germany was likely if
the Allies insisted on extradition, see LEWIS, supra note 87, at 47-49.
93
HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 85 at 329.
94
Trench Duty, in SIEGFRIED SASSOON, COUNTER-ATTACK: AND OTHER POEMS 36 (E.P.
Dutton 1918).
95
The term is, we acknowledge, slightly misleading because without the enormous
pressure of the victors, it is clear that there would have been no trials at all. Nevertheless,
we imagine that a key characteristic of vanquished’s justice is that it is never fully
volitional.
96
On 18 December 1919, the German National Assembly adopted a “Law on Prosecution
of War Crimes and War Offenses,” which incorporated international law on the subject
into German criminal law and extended German jurisdiction extraterritorially. HANKEL,
supra note 85 at 45 (“The law to be applied by the Reich Court in individual cases was in
every case to be German law, including the ‘recognized rules of the laws of nations’
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution.”). Although this option was
probably the only one available, there was also a certain logic to it. As the British
Attorney General remarked at the time, “[i]f the trials had taken place in London, the
probability is that the Germans would have asserted that the trials were unfair, and built a
memorial in Berlin to those who were the subjects of them.” MULLINS, supra note 88 at
13.
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protecting the guilty from punishment for their offenses.”97 As we will see
momentarily, reasserting this jurisdiction would later pose important
problems of criminal procedure. At this juncture, however, the Allied
attitude was necessarily realistic. As the British then-Attorney General
remarked, “[i]f the trials had taken place in London, the probability is that
the Germans would have asserted that the trials were unfair, and built a
memorial in Berlin to those who were the subjects of them.”98
Importantly, the Leipzig courts employed German criminal
procedure to try cases before it.99 Claud Mullins, a bilingual Englishman
sent to cover the trials for the British, dedicated the better part of an entire
chapter of his book for British audiences on the topic to the particularities
of German criminal law procedure. There, he encountered legal pluralism,
observing that “[t]he system of judicial procedure prevailing on the
continent differs in many essential points from that obtaining in
England.”100 In particular, Mullins pointed out that in German criminal
procedure: (a) the Court received and examined all the evidence before the
trial began as distinct from a more adversarial approach that leaves
production of evidence to the discretion of the parties;101 (b) if the accused
decided to testify, the judge and not lawyers examined him first, including
on prior convictions;102 (c) cross examination was not employed in any
form approximating to the English equivalent; 103 and (d) there were no
strict rules of evidence like those that govern criminal trials in AngloAmerican systems.104
Mullins was confronted with doctrinal legal pluralism, and he was
not impressed. As a harbinger for what would later emerge as a recurrent
problem for ICL, he concluded his legal comparison by observing that
“[t]his procedure will strike every English lawyer as strange and
dangerous.”105 Evidently, the problem was less his legal parochialism and
more that the process and resulting verdicts dispensed pursuant to German
criminal procedure would not resonate with his compatriots at home. So,
while the German criminal procedure employed at Leipzig mimicked
Argentine insofar as, historically speaking, it was a “conglomeration of
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HANKEL, supra note 85, at 31.
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For discussion, see HANKEL, supra note 85 at 36.
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various heterogeneous parts,”106 it failed to speak to the full cross-cultural
spectrum of audiences that took a keen, nay furious, interest in the Leipzig
trials.107
To compound this initial sense of alienation, the German legislature
twice amended its usual criminal law procedure to deliberately abdicate
responsibility for “war guilt”. First, a supplementary law passed in
Germany in March 1920 prohibited the Chief Reich Prosecutor from
ending a trial with a dismissal order pursuant to the then German Code of
Criminal Procedure, instead requiring him to submit the file to the Reich
Court with an application for a public dismissal of the case.108 Second, in
May 1921, it added a novel procedural rule that allowed the prosecutor at
Leipzig to bring his own case proprio motu even if there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction.109 As the leading historian on these trials
observes, “[t]his new deviation from German criminal procedure made it
possible for the Reich Prosecutor, in any case in which he found it
desirable for any reason, to go public, knowing full well that a
demonstration of German innocence and a ‘first rate acquittal’ could be
expected.”110
To illustrate, the case against Lieutenant General Karl Stenger for
ordering that no quarter be offered French prisoners of war was dismissed
in precisely this fashion. While in Northern France in August 1914,
Stenger was alleged to have ordered that “[a]ll the prisoners are to be
massacred; the wounded, armed or not, are to be massacred; even men
captured in large organised units are to be massacred. No enemy must
remain alive behind us.”111 Because many Frenchmen were killed as a
result of this order, the French government had listed Stenger atop its list
of “war accused.”112 At trial, Stenger denied having issued the order
despite evidence from his own subordinate to the contrary. Nonetheless,
the Chief Reich’s Prosecutor, i.e. Stenger’s formal accuser, declared that
106

THOMAS VORMBAUM, A MODERN HISTORY OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 84
(Bohlander, Michael ed., Margaret Hiley tran., 2014 edition ed. 2013).
107
According to Lewis, “[i]n France and Belgium, there was intense resentment about the
German invasion, atrocities against civilians, the devastation of agriculture, and the
enemy's military rule in occupied areas.” Evidently, these sentiments were important
political factors motivating the trials. LEWIS, supra note 87, at 32.
108
HANKEL, supra note 85, at 101.
109
Id. at 45. According to Mullins, the relevant procedure read: “when the State Attorney
is of the opinion that the facts do not justify an indictment, he may request a trial in order
that the facts may be ascertained.” MULLINS, supra note 88 at 36.
110
HANKEL, supra note 61, at 45.
111
Id. at 45. See also HANKEL, supra note 85, at 1.
112
Liste des personnes désignées par les Puissances Alliées pour être livrées par
l’Allemagne en execution des article 228 à 230 du traité de Versailles et du Protocole du
28 juin 1919, at 40.
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“I believe him, as I said, completely.”113 The purpose of his trial,
therefore, “was merely to confirm this, especially to a foreign
audience.”114 After Stenger’s acquittal, a large crowd assembled outside
the courthouse in Leipzig to present him with flowers and spit at the
departing French delegation.115
In retaliation, the French and Belgians resorted to a particular,
culturally-specific criminal procedure of their own. A trial in absentia, or
procès par contumace, is a trial without the accused present. The practice
initially developed in France around the 13th Century, at first as a means
of disincentivizing a defendant’s flight. In its earliest inceptions, a trial in
absentia led to the banishment of the defendant from the realm and a
declaration that he or she was an outlaw. Aside from placing the fugitive
outside the law’s protections, outlawry also implied the forfeiture of
assets, which effectively deprived the fugitive’s family of their
inheritance,116 thus motivating defendants to appear in court
(notwithstanding the brutal forms of proof and punishment that awaited
them there). Over the ensuing centuries, the contours of the procès par
contumace morphed in line with changing perceptions of criminal
justice,117 but a variant of the procedure survived the transition into an
inquisitorial model of French criminal procedure, such that it furnished a
viable mechanism for at least rhetorically denouncing Leipzig’s grave
shortcomings.
In the face of a series of Stenger-like acquittals at Leipzig that
deeply enraged the French and Belgian political élite and citizenry,118 both
113

HANKEL, supra note 85, at 101.
Id. at 91.
115
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supra note 85 at 350.
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By increasing the time-frame the defendant was provided an opportunity to appear,
shifting the result from outlawry to conviction of the crime alleged, then making the
conviction provisional in the sense that apprehension of the accused would result in a
retrial ab initio. A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE 161–65 (Little, Brown and Co. 1913).
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The official report on these proceedings analyses the cases that did go to trial. See
German War Trials, Report of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court in Leipzig, 16 AM.
J. INT. LAW 628–631 (1922). For an excellent new set of commentary on these trials, see
Joseph Rikhof, The Istanbul and Leipzig Trials: Myth or Reality?, 1 in HISTORICAL
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CHEAH, & Ping YI eds., 2014); Wolfgang Form, Law as Farce: On the Miscarriage of
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governments harnessed this procedural particularity as a form of local
redress. By comparison with modern war crimes trials, the resulting
procès par contumaces staged in France and Belgium after WWI took
place in truly spectacular numbers, and at light speed. Up to 764 Germans
in occupied territories were already tried by French and Belgian courts by
1920,119 less than two years after the end of the war. And as we saw
earlier, “by December 1924 more than twelve hundred Germans had been
condemned.”120 To the best of our knowledge, the substance of these cases
are entirely undocumented in the history of ICL, so we can say little
conclusive about them. In all likelihood, though, their number and celerity
reveal something of their (un)fairness and the zeal with which they were
brought. If it is true that within the Leipzig trials themselves, French and
Belgian witnesses “breathed hatred,”121 this sentiment surely also affected
trials in absentia at home.
Instead of reviewing these trials in absentia in detail, our purpose is
to highlight how this legally plural procedural arrangement actually
undermined the utility of these trials as exercises in post-war justice. The
hostile use of these two sets of criminal procedure—a novel procedure to
exonerate in already alienating German criminal procedure and trials in
absentia in France and Belgium—amounted to a continuation of war.
German defendants would hear of their convictions in absentia through
French and Belgium newspapers, apply to the Reich Court in Leipzig to
be tried there pursuant to the supplemental procedure in order to be
exonerated, and when the decision exonerating them was forthcoming as
anticipated, it “was publicized in the German, and if possible,
international press.”122 In all, 861 out of 901 allegations were disposed of
Justice at the German Leipzig Trials: The Llandovery Castle Case, 1 in HISTORICAL
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 299–332 (Morten Bergsmo, Wui Ling
CHEAH, & Ping YI eds., 2014); Matthias Neuner, When Justice is Left to the Losers:
The Leipzig War Crimes Trials, 1 in HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 333–378 (Morten Bergsmo, Wui Ling CHEAH, & Ping YI eds., 2014).
119
HANKEL, supra note 1, at 40. It is unclear whether Hankel includes in this figure the
number of Germans tried and convicted during the war itself, which certainly took place
before they were met with reprisals against French prisoners of war, at which point they
came to an abrupt halt. See LEWIS, supra note 87, at 32.
120
WILLIS, supra note 44 at 142.
121
Claud Mullins, "Notes of a Conversation with Herr von Tippelskirch at Leipzig on
Belgian & French War Trials," Hanworth Papers, cited in WILLIS, supra note 86, at 134.
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HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 85 at 353. In an astonishing illustration, the German
government wrote to the Leipzig Court about a Colonel von Giese, who had been
sentenced to death in a trial in absentia held in Belgium, explaining that the Colonel
“wishes that his case be completed in Leipzig as soon as possible,” and that he “wishes to
use the Reich Court decision for his further vindication domestically and abroad.” The
letter concludes that “[b]ecause the case is very beneficial to our propaganda purposes, I
would be especially grateful if you could accommodate Colonel von Giese’s desire for
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in this manner,123 meaning that the whole debacle was of dubious value on
any semi-defensible theory of criminal law and probably
counterproductive as a practical matter.124
To return to procedural pluralism, it was also striking that British
courts could not participate in this ongoing legal conflict. As a matter of
their own local criminal procedure, “British law made no provision for
trials in absentia.”125 Although the point was probably made moot by the
waning British interest in these trials,126 it still bears noting that, first, a
bitter legal contest was waged with criminal law procedure as instrument
between three European nations well after the Peace of Versailles, and
second, that a fourth power had to sit out the contest because of the
idiosyncrasies of its own criminal law procedure. There is much that one
could add about this truly fascinating history127 (including that the legal
contest was also in part about differing Allied and German interpretations

rapid conclusion of his case.” Hankel explains that the case was dismissed less than a
month later as requested. HANKEL, supra note 85, at 360.
123
WILLIS, supra note 86 at 146.
124
In part because they helped consolidate the rise of right-wing power in Germany; See
Jüergen Matthäus, The Lessons of Leipzig: Punishing German War Criminals after the
First World War, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS
OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 3, 16 (Patricia Heberer & Jüergen Matthäus, eds., 2008)
(“The disinclination by German courts to prosecute war criminals attests to the same
prejudice that dominated the German judiciary’s handling of political violence and that
did so much to prepare Hitler’s coming to power.”); Wolfgang Kaleck, “German
International Criminal Law in Practice: From Leipzig to Karlsruhe” in INTERNATIONAL
PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 95, 96 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al, eds., 2007) (on
local courts’ failures to prosecute Nazis for their political violence during the Weimar
years); GORDON WALLACE BAILEY, DRY RUN FOR THE HANGMAN: THE VERSAILLESLEIPZIG FIASCO, 1919 – 1921, FEEBLE FORESHADOW OF NUREMBERG (Univ. of Maryland
PhD Thesis, 1971) 286 (Leipzig was one of the first “steps along the dark road to the
Third Reich”); and, JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 141 (noting that
Hermann Goëring and Adolf Hitler met during an anti-trial demonstration).
125
Id. at 357. Presumably, trials in absentia were not available in English criminal law
because in an accusatory system of criminal procedure “[t]he necessity for the personal
presence of the parties arises, originally, from the very nature of the action, which is a
feigned combat.” See ESMEIN, supra note 117, at 5.
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WILLIS, supra note 86 at 140 (citing a statement by one British official to the effect
that “everybody concerned--most of all the Attorney-General--is only too anxious to let
the whole war criminals question sleep. It only brings us trouble both with the French &
with the Germans.”).
127
Such as the arguments that the Allied use of African soldiers amounted to perfidy. As
one commentator of the period noted, “the use of wild people, even if they have
experienced a temporary taming in the troop unit, [violates] the spirit of international
law.” HANKEL, supra note 85, at 140.
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of the substantive law of war),128 but for present purposes, we seize on
these as well as other procedural shortcomings of local law in these trials
to highlight the limitations of just locating congruence between local
values and criminal law doctrine in a single jurisdiction. That German
criminal procedure at Leipzig reflected German societal values is no
reason for Legal Pluralists to unquestioningly celebrate it as a standard
ICL should embrace, precisely because the Leipzig experience suggests
that impartiality and standards that are meaningful to more than one polity
are countervailing normative aspirations.
Even at the time, commentators believed that universal standards
might have improved matters. As Claud Mullins concluded in reflecting
on the whole experiment with post-war criminal accountability, “there
were difficulties of procedure, due to the widely differing judicial systems
of England and her Allies.”129 Then, with a distinct air of regret, Mullins
openly lamented that “there was no uniform criminal procedure.”130
Whether or not uniformity was achievable or desirable in ICL procedure
at the time, this history presents an important qualification of the ground
we cede through the Argentine example: even if there is evidence that
criminal law doctrine sometimes embodies the values of the underlying
polity as in Argentine criminal procedure, post WWI trials show how
establishing this congruence cannot automatically immunize Legal
Pluralism from broader normative questions about whether ICL should
defer to this national doctrine. Thus, in prescriptive form, Legal Pluralism
is either overly presumptive (much legal doctrine does not reflect popular
local values à la Argentina) or incomplete (venerating pre-existing legal
values in each and every society does not address ICL’s aspiration for
cross-cultural justice as in Leipzig). In what follows, we explore different
variations of these dynamics within the typology we set out by way of
introduction.
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As Hankel notes, international law had not crystallised into custom by the time of the
trials, giving leeway for Germany to differ from the major Entente Powers on the
interpretation of core concepts of the law of war, including the treatment of civilians,
military necessity, and liability for superior orders. HANKEL, supra note 85, at 167–189.
See also Kaleck, supra note 124; Alan Kramer, The First Wave of International War
Crimes Trials: Istanbul and Leipzig 14 EUR. REV. 441 (2006) (that the German view of
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III. INCHOATE CRIMES
Armed with our Argentine example of apparent coincidence
between criminal law doctrine and social values, plus our illustration from
the post-WWI experience of the limitations of even this exemplar, we
move to the first illustration of our typology. In this Part, we discuss an
inchoate crime in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and another
in post-WWII international tribunals to showcase how doctrine is not a
dependable analytical stand-in for social, cultural or political values.
Specifically, we show how social value and criminal doctrine come apart
where criminal law is part and parcel of the violent repression ICL exists
to counteract. In both the DRC and post-WWII tribunals, this unfortunate
reality manifests. Because criminal doctrine serves an oppressive function
in both contexts, it appears to fall well short of matching the overlap
between social value and criminal doctrine evident in our Argentine
example, even leaving aside the caveat we take from Leipzig. In other
words, where criminal doctrine is an instrument of repression, relying on
it as even a partial guarantor of cosmopolitanism in ICL seems sharply
ahistorical, undermining the very utility of Legal Pluralism as a
prescriptive theory of global normativity.
The word “inchoate” means “just begun” or “undeveloped.”131 In
most jurisdictions, the concept of “inchoate offenses” criminalizes
conduct that is prior to the realization of a consummated offense. As
Andrew Ashworth explains:
[A] principal feature of these crimes is that they are
committed even though the substantive offense (i.e. the
offense it was intended to bring about) is not completed and
no harm results. An attempt fails, conspiracy comes to
nothing, words of incitement are ignored – in all these
instances, there may be liability for the inchoate crime.132
Thus, as Ashworth’s explanation suggests, there are three general offenses
that are usually termed “inchoate” or “preliminary” in common law
131

ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 437 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing
inchoate offences generally, and the trend in English criminal law to widen the scope of
the three traditional inchoate crimes). See also, JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 373 (6th ed. 2012) (“Activity in the middle ranges [between formation of
an idea and completed criminal action], i.e., after the formation of the mens rea but short
of attainment of the criminal goal, is described as ‘inchoate’ – imperfect or incomplete –
conduct.”
132
ASHWORTH, supra note 131, at 373.
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jurisdictions – attempt, conspiracy, and incitement.133 Unsurprisingly,
foreign jurisdictions understand inchoate crimes differently, in part
because punishing unconsummated offences raises the specter of thought
crimes: the dangerous intrusion of the criminal law into the realm of
purely personal ideation.134
If different jurisdictions enact diverse rules governing when
criminal plans are adequately ripe to warrant punishment (i.e. great
doctrinal plurality), it should come as no surprise that ICL is caught
between these competing sensibilities. Yet it would be premature to
equate doctrinal pluralism, either in the law governing inchoate crimes in
ICL or in the national law it draws upon, with a diversity of popular
values within either constituency. In fact, in this the first element of our
typology, we see how criminal law doctrine may be a vehicle for overt
human rights repression, such that we want to deliberately deny legal
diversity. To illustrate, we draw on the inchoate crime of association de
malfaiteurs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We select
this example because of the Francophone colonial lineage, because this
inchoate offense will be somewhat exotic to Anglophone audiences, and
because the DRC is a country international criminal institutions are rightly
engaged with at present. Most importantly, however, we choose this initial
example because association de malfaiteurs is now used to systematically
silence Congolese human rights defenders. And strikingly, although there
are major discontinuities, the use of conspiracy at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
which we discuss further below, reveals more continuity than rupture with
its Francophone equivalent.
A.

Association de Malfaiteurs as Repression in the Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, is one of the
largest countries in Africa. The country’s history is spectacular, starting
with Belgian King Leopold annexing the territory as his own personal
property,135 then ruling with astonishing brutality.136 Later, all the uranium

133

Id.
Antony Duff, for instance, argues that privacy and autonomy are the primary rationale
for why thought crimes are objectionable. See ANTONY DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME:
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2007). See also, DOUGLAS
HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 47–51 (2010)
(discussing criminal liability for thoughts, including inchoate crimes).
135
ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST : A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (Mariner Books ed. 1998). For a more recent history, see
also DAVID VAN REYBROUCK, CONGO: THE EPIC HISTORY OF A PEOPLE (2014).
134
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for the Manhattan Project would come from the DRC, Che Guevara would
find himself fighting in the country, and Western leaders would
assassinate Patrice Lumumba – the first democratically elected President
of the newly independent nation – for his Communist leanings. In modern
times, the DRC has suffered what Madeline Albright dubbed “Africa’s
First World War,”137 leading to in excess of 5 million civilian deaths since
just 1998.138 And as political scientist Kevin Dunn reports, Joseph
Conrad’s famous novel Heart of Darkness139 has probably proved
something of a curse for the Congolese people too, since it set in stone
perceptions that “this central African country was a land of violence,
chaos, and avarice, perhaps beyond the comprehension of Western
audiences.”140
Inevitably, Congolese criminal law was and remains inextricably
caught up in this bleak history such that it is readily distinguishable from
our earlier Argentine example. Prior to Belgian colonialism, the mode of
social governance was collective and concentric. Governance occurred at
various subgroupings of increasing importance, starting with clans, then
tribes, and culminating in sovereign ethnicities as the largest political
unit.141 The cosmological commitment to “increasingly vital force”
136

As Hochschild points out, John Dunlop’s discovery of the rubber tire initially sparked
a craze for the bicycle, but this paved the way for an even more popular Western fixation:
the automobile. As Hochschild observed with no small dose of irony given the hellish
implications it would have for the Congolese, “[f]or Leopold, the rubber boom was a
godsend.” HOCHSCHILD, supra note 135 at 158–59.
137
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Welcoming Remarks at the UN Security
Council Session on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 (Jan. 24, 2000) (transcript
available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000124.html) (“Because of
that nation’s location and size, and because of the number of countries involved, the
conflict there could be described as Africa’s first world war.”). Gérard Prunier, arguably
the leading historian of the region, has also employed the metaphor. See GERARD
PRUNIER, AFRICA’S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AND THE MAKING
OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE (2009).
138
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS 16 (2007) (estimating 5.4 million excess deaths in the first
decade of the conflict, from 1998 to 2007).
139
JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS AND OTHER TALES (Cedric Watts ed., 2008).
For recurrent references to Conrad’s metaphor, see ROBERT EDGERTON, THE TROUBLED
HEART OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF THE CONGO (2002); LOSO KITETI BOYA, D. R. CONGO:
THE DARKNESS OF THE HEART: HOW THE CONGOLESE HAVE SURVIVED 500 YEARS OF
HISTORY (2010); MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON THE
BRINK OF DISASTER IN MOBUTU’S CONGO (2002).
140
KEVIN C. DUNN, IMAGINING THE CONGO: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF
IDENTITY 4 (2003).
141
E. Lamy, Le problème de l’intégration du droit congolais: son origine, son évolution,
son avenir, numéro spécial REVUE JURIDIQUE DU CONGO 135–287, 142 (1965). Lamy is
also clear that there were occasionally “souverainetés racialement hétérogènes.”
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formed the foundation of this system, which was especially significant,
since life-force was located in the group’s ancestral history.142 As a result,
customary rules were frequently divided into two domains: (a) the Laws
of the Sacred and the invisible; and (b) the Laws of the living and the
visible.143 The former entailed a network of obligations that were
ascertained through specialists in sacred law; the latter varied from place
to place and attached to individuals by dint of being born into a particular
normative system.144
By all accounts, individualized forms of punishment were very
much the exception across either system. Local communities, for example,
“knew of no prisons.”145 According to one noted commentator, “[f]orms
of physical restraint were used, but normally only to detain an offender
pending his trial or punishment and even then rarely; certainly detention in
itself does not appear to have been regarded as a punishment.146 Corporal
punishment for wrongdoing existed, but had “a very limited
application.”147 Instead, collective responsibility of the community as a
whole, compensation, and ostracism of individual perpetrators from the
collective were all the norm.148 As Dembour concludes, “Les Africains
étaient habitués à un système où ce qui comptaitétait la compensation de
la victim et non le châtiment du coupable (sauf pour des faits graves ou
répétés où le châtiment était alors impitoyable).”149 The Belgians,
however, saw this as “la barbarie.”150
142

Id. at 143 (translated by first author).
Id.
144
Id.
145
James S. Read, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 89, 103
(Alan Milner ed., 1969).
146
Id. at 103.
147
Id. at 104.
148
Marie-Benedicte Dembour, La peine durant la colonisation belge, in Transactions of
the Jean Bodin Society for Comparative Institutional History, Vol. LVII, PUNISHMENT
67, 72 (1991) (“En effet, en Afrique prévalait une conception toute différente, qui faisait
reposer la responsabilité sur le groupe auquel appartenait le coupable – sauf dans le cas
où le groupe se désolidarisait du dernier en l’excluant.”); Read, supra note 145, at 105
("The interdependence of individuals in the close-knit societies of earlier times made
ostracism a potent sanction.").
149
Dembour, supra note 148, at 92 (“Africans were used to a system where
compensation to the victim was what mattered, not punishment of the guilty individual
(except for grave or repeated crimes, where the punishment was without mercy”
(Stewart’s translation)).
150
Id. at 92. In fairness, one of the practices for dispute resolution that the Belgians took
particular exception to involved a form of proof that required two parties to a dispute to
imbibe toxic drinks called N’Kassa, which were administered by sorcerers. Predictably,
the colonial reaction to these practices came with strong civilizing overtones. Writing in
1898, Félicien Cattier, a close friend of King Leopold, Chairman of the Union minière
143
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By a decree dated January 7th, 1886, King Leopold promulgated
the Congo’s first penal code (Code Pénal du Congo). The new code
involved “vocabulary, formulation, and structure that was directly
borrowed from Belgian criminal law legislation”.151 Although it was
probably seen as an instrument for civilizing backwards or child-like
African customs,152 in truth, the Code served far darker purposes. Writing
in 1908, a close friend to King Leopold, Chairman of the Union minière
du-Haut-Katanga (one of the most prominent Congolese mining
companies) and Dean of the Université Libre de Bruxelles’ Law School
declared that “[t]he Congo State is not a colonizing state, hardly a state: it
is a financial company […] its aim has simply been to procure a maximum
of resources for the King himself.”153 To do this, the King and his agents
had to resort to what Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja calls “primitive
accumulation” through “the use of torture, murder and other inhumane
methods to compel Congolese to abandon their way of life to produce or
do whatever the colonial state required of them.”154 The brutality that
ensued was stupendous – a recent historiography estimated that as many
as 10 million Congolese were murdered or disappeared under King
Leopold’s reign, placing him among the most infamous purveyors of mass
violence in known history.155
Importantly for present purposes, the criminal law enabled rather
than curtailed this violence. In an open letter of protest to King Leopold in
1890 after a period in the Congo, American anti-slavery campaigner
George Washington Williams objected that “the Courts of your Majesty’s
Government [in the Congo] are abortive, unjust, partial and delinquent.”156
du-Haut-Katanga and Dean of the Université Libre de Bruxelles’ Law School claimed “le
pouvoir colonial, exerçant son autorité, voulut à tout prix extirper de telles coutumes
qualifiée mauvais parce qu’infrieures aux principle généraux de civilization.” FÉLICIEN
CATTIER, DROIT ET ADMINISTRATION DE L’ETAT INDEPENDANT DU CONGO 442 (1898).
151
Dembour, supra note 148, at 67.
152
For a full exposition of colonial authorities referring to African populations as childlike, see MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND
THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 12 (1996).
153
FÉLICIEN CATTIER, ÉTUDE SUR LA SITUATION DE L’ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU CONGO 341
(1906) (Stewart’s translation).
154
GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY 22 (2002).
155
WILTZ MARC, IL PLEUT DES MAINS SUR LE CONGO (Magellan et Cie 2015). The
number of prominent authors protesting Belgian atrocities in the Congo was striking. See
SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE CRIME OF THE CONGO 14–15 (1909); See also Mark
Twain’s brilliant satire in MARK TWAIN, KING LEOPOLD’S SOLILOQUY: A DEFENSE OF
HIS CONGO RULE (The P. R. Warren Co., 2nd ed. 1905).
156
George Washington Williams, “An Open Letter to His Serene Majesty Leopold II,
King of the Belgians and Sovereign of the Independent State of Congo By Colonel, The
Honorable Geo. W. Williams, of the United States of America,” 1890
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The statement is corroborated by both the substance and enforcement of
Congolese criminal law. The criminal law enacted for the DRC was
considerably harsher than domestic Belgian criminal law of the time: the
Belgian distinction between crimes, délits and peines was abrogated in the
“vérsion simplifiée” imposed in the Congo,157 depriving the criminal law
of important moral nuance. Attempts were punished the same way as
completed crimes;158 and most significantly, only Africans received the
infamous chicotte,159 the notoriously brutal whip made of dried
hippopotamus hide. This whip, sanctioned by overtly racist criminal law
doctrine, was at the heart of an intensely violent system of colonial
governance.160 One Belgian District Commissioner in the Congo remarked
as late as 1950, that “I used the punishment very sparingly. But its effect
was terrible. We were so proud to be members of the administrative
service, we felt so powerful. But all our power had its roots in the
chicotte.”161
We seize on one inchoate crime that featured in the 1886 Code
Pénal du Congo, which by no small coincidence, has survived as a means
http://www.blackpast.org/george-washington-williams-open-letter-king-leopold-congo1890
157
CATTIER, supra note 153 at 437 (explaining that “La loi congolaise ne connaît pas la
distinction en crimes, délits et peines, qui est à la base du système répressif belge.”);
Dembour, supra note 148, at 86 (“En effet, les testes sont d’inspiration belge, mais vu
leur brièveté, ils ne présentent du système belge qu’une version simplifiée.”
158
CATTIER, supra note 153 at 440.
159
Dembour, supra note 148, at 86 (observing “la ségrégation qui régnait au sein de la
société congolaise [...]. Celle-ci se situait à la fois dans la nature de la peine applicable –
seuls les Africains recevaient la chicote – et dans la manière dont la peine était appliquée
– un régime carcéral différent était prévu [...] l’Africain était en effet puni selon une
échelle plus sévère que celle appliquée à l’Européen.”).
160
Roger Casement, a British Consul stationed in Congo returned to Britain in 1903 to
write a report on the Belgian atrocities in the Congo, in which he provided “detailed
documentation and graphic examples of abuses, mainly the use of the chicotte (a type of
whip) and the chopping off of hands and other body parts as punishment for failing to
procure the required amount of rubber.” According to Dunn, “these reports recast the
Congolese as victims of Belgian barbarity.” DUNN, supra note 140 at 52. WRONG, supra
note 139, at 47 (“The chicotte, the gallows, mass executions were all liberally applied ill
a campaign that often seemed to have extermination of races deemed inferior as an
incidental aim.”).
161
WRONG, supra note 139, at 39–40; REYBROUCK, supra note 135, at 216 (explaining
that even in the 1950s, “[c]orporal punishment with the chicotte was still applied to all
Africans, even those who could distinguish the Latin dative case from the genitive and
read De Gaulle’s speeches.”). Evidently, the chicotte’s use was so widespread that it has
taken on an important symbolic function within the Congolese memory of colonialism.
See, critically, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, La chicotte comme symbole du colonialisme
belge?, 26 CANADIAN J. AFR. STUD./LA REVUE CANADIENNE DES ÉTUDES AFRICAINES
205 (1992).
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of silencing human rights defenders and pro-democracy movements in the
modern DRC. The chicotte is abandoned but the underlying criminal law
lives on.
Association de malfaiteurs literally means association of
wrongdoers. Soon after the French Revolution, the French legislature set
about codifying new criminal rules in response to excesses in the
preceding period.162 To deal with marauding groups of organized
criminals that had taken advantage of the insecurity that reigned during
the revolution, the French Code Pénal of 1810 constructed a new inchoate
offense that criminalized criminal associations.163 The Belgian criminal
code of 1867 borrowed the then novel doctrine from its neighbor,164 just in
time for the wholesale transmission of a rough-and-ready form of Belgian
criminal law into the DRC a decade later. As a result of this
uncomfortable passage, association de malfaiteurs became a criminal
offense amongst an African people who did not agree to the rule and
probably suffered terribly as a result of its very one-sided enforcement.
After all, in a technical sense, much of what transpired under Belgian
colonial rule satisfied the definition of the offense, vindicating Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle’s choice of title for his oeuvre on the topic, The Crime of the
Congo.
As a doctrine, association de malfaiteurs has survived unscathed in
Congolese criminal law to this day. In 1940, the Belgians again
promulgated a Criminal Code for the Congo by decree, which largely reenacted the earlier law in a slightly more coordinated fashion that,
predictably, was again “patterned after the Belgian Criminal Code.”165
Independence in 1960 did not lead to a sharp break with this history,
162

Marcel Culioli & Pierre Gioanni, Association de Malfaiteurs, 80 REVUE
PÉNITENTIAIRE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL 1, 22 (2007) (referring to a particularly notorious
group of organized criminals called the “Chauffers”, who pillaged and killed throughout
the countryside during the period); RAPHAËLE PARIZOT, GENEVIÈVE GIUDICELLI-DELAGE
& ALESSANDRO BERNARDI, LA RESPONSABILITÉ PÉNALE À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA
CRIMINALITÉ ORGANISÉE : LE CAS SYMPTOMATIQUE DE L’ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS
ET DU BLANCHIMENT EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE 131 (2010) (confirming this history).
163
Culioli and Gioanni, supra note 162, at 22 (referring to a particularly notorious group
of organized criminals called the “Chauffers”, who pillaged and killed throughout the
countryside during the period); PARIZOT, GIUDICELLI-DELAGE, AND BERNARDI, supra
note 162, at 131 (confirming this history). The initial language stipulated that “Toute
association de malfaiteurs envers les personnes ou les propriétés, est un crime contre la
paix publique.” CODE DES DÉLITS ET DES PEINES art. 265 (1810) (Belg.),
http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fontes/CodePenal1810.htm (last visited June 1, 2017).
164
Frank Verbruggen & Philip Traest, Belgique, 73 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PÉNAL 13 (2007).
165
ANTON WEKERLE, GUIDE TO THE TEXT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
CODES
OF
BURUNDI, RWANDA, AND ZAIRE 25 (1975),
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/010452689 (last visited Feb 5, 2015).
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meaning that association de malfaiteurs continued in Congolese criminal
law without major modification: as leading commentators agreed soon
after independence that “[w]ith the change to Republican status, the
criminal law has scarcely changed.”166 Evidently, the same remains true
today. The leading modern textbook on Congolese criminal law –
authored by the Dean of the School of Law at the University of Kinshasa –
still draws a direct line between the current criminal code, the decree of 20
January 1940, and that of 7 January 1886.167 Taking ICL as an interpenetrating normative system that respects extant doctrine needs to
simultaneously grapple with this lineage. Based on this preliminary
historical inquiry, it seems far removed from the example of Argentine
criminal procedure (to say nothing of the problems of diversity raised in
the study of Leipzig).
Despite our best efforts, we have not unearthed material suggesting
that association de malfaiteurs was debated, reconsidered, and
enthusiastically retained by anyone over this history, let alone some entity
with meaningful democratic credentials capable of vesting a degree of
popular acquiescence into a rule derived from a spectacularly brutal
history. Whereas Argentine procedure was redesigned in an eclectic
fashion based on the needs of a changing society, association de
malfaiteurs remains largely unchanged. Association de malfaiteurs is only
Congolese law by omission; it is “Congolese” only because the Congolese
have not repealed it. And to undermine the thesis that this omission
somehow evidences popular endorsement of the imposed rule (like
Pakistani enthusiasm for cricket or Argentine retention of some aspects of
Spanish criminal procedure), observe also the repressive function this
criminal law doctrine continues to play vis-à-vis the local population in
this country. Association de malfaiteurs is no friend to everyday
Congolese—it still appears to function as a mechanism that maintains a
violent social order for the betterment of the few who wield it.
To the extent association de malfeiteurs can meaningfully be
described as ‘Congolese’, it is an instrument of violence for certain
elements of the Congolese state. In 2013, twelve Congolese human rights
defenders were arrested, tried and convicted of association de malfaiteurs
166

Antoine Rubbens, The Congo Democratic Republic, in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 14,
16 (1969). Although Rubbens was writing in 1969, only a matter of years after
independence, more recent studies conclude similiarly. See, e.g., Marie-Benedicte
Dembour, supra note 148 at 69, (“Encore aujourd’hui, le système pénal zaïrois reste
fortement imprégné des principes que le colonisateur belge a introduits...”).
167
NYABIRUNGU MWENE SONGA, TRAITÉ DE DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL CONGOLAIS 49
(2001) (“La loi pénale trouve son siège principal au code pénal. Celui-ci, qui est
aujourd’hui porté par le décret du 30 janvier 1940, a eu un début de formulation dans un
texte législatif du 7 janvier 1886”.).
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for having encouraged people to participate in peaceful demonstrations
against an increase in energy and water prices, as well as the general
mismanagement by the Governor of the province.168 Likewise, in 2006, a
Congolese bishop and two others were convicted of association de
malfaiteurs soon after the bishop televised a sermon criticizing the
Congolese President, in a trial that Amnesty International called
“summary and unfair.”169 Evidently, these are not isolated incidents. The
misuse of association de malfaiteurs is so common that after listing at
least five other very recent examples in the Congo, one representative of a
human rights organization in the DRC wrote to us that “there are so many
of these cases throughout the entire territory that it is difficult for the
moment to draw up a decent list.”170 If leading western human rights
organizations are up in arms protesting the excessive application of
association de malfaiteurs in France,171 it is of little surprise that the same
doctrine is having much worse consequences in the far periphery.
168

Evidently, the defendants were not able to present a defense, pressure was placed on
judges to enter convictions, and the defendants were prohibited from raising claims about
physical abuse in custody. Fédération internationale des droits de l’Homme (FIDH),
RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (RDC) : CONDAMNATION EN APPEL DE 12
DÉFENSEURS
DES
DROITS
DE
(...), http://www.fidh.org/fr/afrique/republiquedemocratique-du-congo/republique-democratique-du-congo-rdc-condamnation-en-appelde-12-13194 (last visited Jul. 31, 2014).
169
Amnesty International, Républic démocratique du Congo: Persistance de la torture et
des homicides par des agents de l'État chargé de la sécurité, Indiex AI: AFR
62/012/2007, at 16-17.
170
Email correspondence with Congolese human rights representative (name and
organization withheld), June 12, 2014. On file with authors. (“Il y a autant des dossiers
sur l’ensemble du territoire qu’il est difficile pour le moment de faire une bonne liste”)
(Stewart’s translation).
171
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE: COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND
PROCEDURES IN FRANCE 8 (2008) (protesting that “[t]he overly broad formulation of the
association de malfaiteurs offense has led, in our view, to convictions based on weak or
circumstantial evidence.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF PREVENTION:
INSUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY REMOVAL 19 (2007) (quoting a
French criminal lawyer as reporting that “you are the cousin of the cousin of the cousin
of someone who’s done something, so you are in an association de malfaiteurs. The
concept is very vague. It’s the law itself that’s dangerous.... [and] the defense becomes
impossible’.”). Theorists of French criminal law also object that association de
malfaiteurs has become “a veritable rupture of the theory of criminal participation’s
limits.” RAPHAËLE PARIZOT, LA RESPONSABILITÉ PÉNALE À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA
CRIMINALITÉ ORGANISÉE : LE CAS SYMPTOMATIQUE DE L’ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS
ET DU BLANCHIMENT EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE 129 (2010) (translated by first author). See
also, Culioli & Gioanni, supra note 162, at 20 (listing a set of conceptual problems with
the application of association de malfaiteurs in France); Evidently, association de
malfaiteurs is used extensively, including in the vast majority of cases involving arrest on
suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES
DROITS DE L’HOMME, FRANCE PAVING THE WAY FOR ARBITRARY JUSTICE 9 (1999).
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Hopefully, this history exposes the underbelly of the criminal law
to which ICL cannot afford to turn a blind eye to. As Jacqueline Costa has
argued, “[i]n Africa, criminal law is not the codified expression of the
values of an established social order. It is a tool to be used in the very
creation of such an order.”172 Her point is more sinister than a quick
reading suggests. Frequently, criminal law doctrine does not represent
popular social values; it often continues a long history of violent
repression in the service of authoritarian rule. The criminal law in Nazi
Germany and Stalin’s Russia are just extreme examples of an
unfortunately common trend that flows into an appreciable number of
modern states. Although we have not unearthed examples of association
de malfaiteurs being employed in this fashion during the colonial period,
it certainly appears to operate this way in the DRC now. In line with the
history of the colonial criminal law that produced it, association de
malfaiteurs seems to have become a highly one-sided instrument to further
governance by force, and in extremis, to systematically undermine
enjoyment of basic human rights. The parallels with the past are striking.
If this reading is even somewhat accurate, allowing international
rules to defer to, absorb, or mirror legal doctrine from countries that find
themselves in a similar situation as the DRC in the name of Legal
Pluralism is not necessarily the noble act of respect it might seem at first
blush—as is the case here, the doctrine in question may actually stem
from elsewhere, have been imposed by force as part of a brutal campaign
of subjugation and plunder, and may operate to inhibit political
participation, freedom of expression, and other fundamental rights.
Criminal law is sometimes part of the problem ICL exists to address, such
that resistance for reasons of principle and not deference in the name of
Legal Pluralism is the appropriate normative response. Moreover, the
problem is not just whether the criminal law doctrine complies with
human rights in an abstract conceptual sense, such that Legal Pluralists
can save their position by crafting human rights as a generic exception; it
is also whether the doctrine enjoys any democratic legitimacy, whether it
represents a terrible past local populations hope to leave well behind them,
and whether a facially defensible criminal law doctrine operates within a
concrete sociological frame to the great detriment of those affected—
physically, socially or symbolically.
In all these respects, conceiving of ICL as a diverse, conflicting,
sometimes inter-penetrating normative system to be managed, without
adding a sophisticated historical critique of the norm(s) in question risks
tarring ICL with the same brush as the objectionable national criminal law
172

Jacqueline Costa, Penal Policy and Under-Development in French Africa, in AFRICAN
PENAL SYSTEMS 365, 393 (1969).
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standards it draws upon. This is quite apart from the difficulty we learn
from Leipzig, that drawing on single jurisdictions might underappreciate
the need for a brand of criminal justice that speaks neutrally across
multiple cultures. In other words, championing a diversity of legal
doctrine to preserve doctrinal heterogeneity is, methodologically speaking,
dangerous if carried out without first adopting what James Whitman calls
a “sociohistorical perspective” on the criminal law,173 then assessing
countervailing normative aspirations for the field. As Franz Kafka was so
earnest to remind us, that perspective will sometimes confirm that
criminal law doctrine is part and parcel of what his fellow novelist Joseph
Conrad called “the horror”.174
B.

The Repressive Aspects of Conspiracy at the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals

We move, then, from the experience of association de malfaiteurs
in the Congo, to conspiracy, the Anglo-American inchoate offense applied
at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to discuss the international
equivalent of our typology’s first element – instances where criminal
doctrine is part of the problem ICL exists to counteract. Here too, we
observe courts drawing on national legal standards, but standards that,
despite appearances, actually stem from a very small number of Western
states. Whereas the Congolese experience involved the passage of a
French inchoate offense through Belgium, the international experience of
conspiracy at both postwar tribunals arose from English criminal law that
was imported into ICL via and at the behest of the United States. In both
instances, the law was foreign and therefore alien to its ultimate audiences
(as in Leipzig), deeply one-sided in application, operated to expunge basic
human rights and, ultimately, was very deliberately deployed to construct
a social order by force rather than popular approval. To be sure, there are
very significant differences between these two examples, but by and large,
one is left with the sense that international criminal doctrine is again no
trustworthy guarantor of the value-pluralism that pluralists tacitly seek to
uphold once they shift from a descriptive to a normative mode.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Nuremberg was an almost complete
173
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reversal of Leipzig.175 In the memorable words of the US Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, by late 1944, the end of the Third Reich was
“approaching on a galloping horse.”176 This looming event raised a
pressing set of questions for the Allies: what would become of Hitler and
his cronies after their fall? Initially, both Britain and the United States
were firmly in favor of mass executions. Indeed, it was only when Henry
Morgenthau’s plan to execute Nazis en masse and reduce Germany to an
agrarian society was leaked to the American public that Allied policy
begrudgingly tilted in favor of trials.177 Public opinion in the United Stated
viewed the now infamous Morgenthau Plan as “inhumane,” creating new
impetus to try rather than shoot the vanquished enemy.178 Even then, the
British still needed much convincing, probably because their memories of
Leipzig were still fresh.179 By this point, though, the Americans were hard
at work determining what law they could possibly use to achieve this
tremendous feat. The stakes were high, especially when some were
tempted to see these trials as “the Ten Commandments, Magna Carta, and
the Gettysburg Address all rolled into one.”180
In early autumn 1944, a New York securities lawyer named
Colonel Murray C. Bernay, then working for the U.S. War Department,
175
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hatched a plan to combine the use of conspiracy and membership in
criminal organizations to capture a broad swath of Nazi hardliners and
sympathizers alike, without going to the trouble of proving who did
what.181 Very quickly, this doctrine of conspiracy would find itself front
and center at Nuremberg and Tokyo thereafter (although courts would
interpret it restrictively and as applying only to aggression).182 This notion
of conspiracy came with a number of major shortcomings leading up to, at
and subsequent to the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, often revealing the
same sorts of difficulties as its cousin association de malfaiteurs in the
Congo. Consequently, this history again reveals a dark shadow from
which modern ICL may wish to distance itself. This process of distancing
may be preferable to permitting all ICL doctrine to simply co-exist
alongside other doctrinal arrangements, within a system of legal diversity
to be tolerated and managed.
During the negotiation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, it
quickly emerged that—as with the use of German criminal procedure at
Leipzig—defining and using conspiracy risked alienating the trial’s
closest audiences. Herbert Wechsler, a Professor at Columbia Law School
(then acting as U.S. Assistant Deputy General, but famous for his later
role in spearheading the drafting of the U.S. Model Penal Code) wrote a
detailed memorandum forewarning that “some confusion may be
engendered by the terminology of the War Department proposal which
refers to the basic crime as a ‘common-law conspiracy,’ employing that
concept as it is known to American law.”183
The confusion Wechsler’s foresaw came to pass. When the whole
conspiracy/criminal organizations scheme was presented to the Russians
and French, their representatives were left veritably dumb-founded by the
idea of using an inchoate crime like conspiracy to enmesh Nazis high and
181
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low for harm that did actually transpire. Momentarily, we will discuss
retorts that conspiracy was actually part of continental legal systems, but
for now, note that if this was formally true as a matter of comparative law
doctrine, the fact was entirely lost on French and Russian representatives
at Nuremberg. In an often-quoted passage, the noted historian of the
Nuremberg trials, Bradley F. Smith, reported that:
[T]he Russians and French seemed unable to grasp all the
implications of the concept [conspiracy]; when they finally
did grasp it, they were genuinely shocked. The French
viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal mechanism unworthy
of modern law, while the Soviets seemed to have shaken their
head in wonderment—a reaction, some cynics may believe,
prompted by envy. But the main point of the Soviet attack on
conspiracy was that it was too vague and so unfamiliar to the
French and themselves, as well as to the Germans, that it
would lead to endless confusion.184
Despite the apparent surprise, there was continual disagreement in
pleadings before both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals about whether
or not conspiracy was actually alien to civil law systems. In one camp,
leading civil lawyers protested the concept’s intrusion into ICL. Bert
Röling, the Dutch Judge at Tokyo, for instance, described conspiracy as
“one of the ugly aspects of the Anglo-American system,”185 protesting that
“[i]n the continental European countries conspiracy has played only a very
limited role.”186 Similarly, August von Knieriem, the lawyer for I.G.
Farben who was tried and acquitted at Nuremberg, subsequently wrote a
lengthy legal polemic criticizing the concept more forcefully: “[t]o the
continental lawyer and to the layman, too, the Anglo-American concepts
of conspiracy and of accessory after the fact are hard to understand and
their results appear to be unfair.”187 In the competing camp, a number of
commentators have argued that these critics were altogether too coy about
184
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the uptake of conspiracy in continental legal systems, including in both
German and Japanese criminal law.188 Instead of taking sides in this
contest, we focus on the analytical methodology the Tokyo Tribunal
adopted to justify its controversial conclusion that, despite all the
foregoing hesitation and critique, conspiracy was a general principle
common to all nations.189
When the issue of conspiracy’s legitimacy in international law was
addressed at the Tokyo Tribunal, the Prosecution argued that all four
major powers approved of the two Charters in which this apparently
foreign concept appeared, and eighteen of twenty-two other states that
also signed the London Agreement were civil law jurisdictions.190 On
closer inspection, however, this argument was not especially compelling
in that this assent was subject to the same dynamics that manufactured
criminal law throughout the globe: in truth, brute power probably
overrode consent as a plausible explanation for conspiracy’s entry into the
corpus of ICL. In negotiating the Charters, even the Allies complained of
“an arbitrary and domineering American manner,”191 so “that in the end
the Americans pretty much had their way was surely more of a tribute to
their great power… than it was to any skills they showed in
diplomacy.”192 In this light, conspiracy’s ability to claim any crosscultural endorsement in ICL today seems poor.
The inchoate offense’s right to peaceful co-existence in a plural
ICL is even weaker still if we interrogate its history further. In a rousing
set of arguments at Tokyo, defense lawyers began by repeating the
familiar argument that the doctrine treated as universal that which was
highly particular. Counsel for the defense argued that conspiracy’s
188
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inclusion in the Tokyo Tribunal’s Statute was “astonishing!,”193 and asked
rhetorically: “Are not all comparativist jurists aware that the doctrine of
criminal conspiracy is a peculiar product of English legal history?”194 In
addressing this history directly, the defense also pointed out that even
Adam Smith had shown that conspiracy was initially used in Britain to
penalize trade unions, “a social class highly obnoxious to the dominant
class in the eighteenth century.”195 Similarly, they cited Harvard Professor
Francis Bowes Sayre’s conclusion that “a doctrine so vague in its outlines
and uncertain in its fundamental nature as conspiracy lends no strength or
glory to law, it is a veritable quick-sand of shifting opinion and illconsidered thought.”196 If conspiracy was a vague “weapon of
convenience” for the powerful nationally, as Sayre suggested, was
migrating it into ICL doing much of a service to the majority of the world?
We do not believe that Legal Pluralism can wash its hands of this question
now, just because the Tokyo Tribunal once did.
No matter how one answers this question though, the mechanics of
conspiracy’s absorption into ICL were highly suspect. At Tokyo, the Chief
Prosecutor – an American named Joseph Keenan – tabled a comparative
survey of conspiracy-like provisions in several legal systems in an attempt
to refute the argument that “conspiracy is not an international crime
because… it is a doctrine peculiar to the Anglo-American law.”197 In an
ambitious bid to synthesize criminal doctrine applicable in Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Spain, China, and Japan, Keenan made a
methodological error that concerns us still today about the operation of
Legal Pluralism in ICL. In the context of France, Keenan cited the
provision of the French Code Pénal governing association de malfaiteurs
without any apparent appreciation as to its history, within France or
beyond.198 To compound matters, when turning to Spain, he surmised that
“Spain, and all the countries which were formerly Spanish colonies,
including the Philippines, base their penal codes on the original Code
Napoleon of 1810, which is, of course, also the source of the French Penal
Code.”199 In all likelihood, this genealogy is quite accurate, but the
method should be disquieting to those who care about infusing ICL with a
plurality of social, cultural and political values—we know what
association de malfaiteurs might mean within these recipient
193
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communities.
The concerns with respect to conspiracy’s entry into ICL also
appear at the level of its application, albeit in a different guise. Many, like
Gerry Simpson, have recognized that conspiracy probably worked well
enough at Nuremberg “but it was discredited at Tokyo.”200 Japanese
historians express no opinion on the first aspect of the claim, but they
agree with the second. Several years ago, a noted Japanese scholar
reported that “I doubt that any Japanese historian – and there are many
historians present today – still accepts the interpretation of conspiracy, or
of an overall common plan, put forward in the Tokyo Trial’s view of
history.”201 Evidently, there were many smaller conspiracies, rather than
one all-encompassing “gigantic” one.202 The implications of this excessive
application for the defendants go without saying, but for now, we focus
just on the political and sociological implications of this broad standard’s
application, recalling comparable problems with association de
malfaiteurs in the Congo.
At Tokyo, conspiracy speaks to a repeat of the double standards
we witnessed with respect to the chicotte—Japanese defendants were
charged and convicted of conspiracy to wage war against “French
Indochina.” Within the section of the Tokyo Judgment that deals with
Japanese aggression in Indo-China, the Tribunal set out how “[i]n June
1940, shortly after the fall of France, she [France] was forced to agree
with Japan’s demands to permit a military mission into Indo-China”.203
On 25 August, the French Ambassador informed the Japanese “that
France had decided to yield to the Japanese demands,” and the so-called
Matsuoka-Henri Agreement was signed.204 In brushing aside defense
arguments that this agreement precluded a finding of aggression, the
majority in the Tokyo Tribunal reasoned that “the sovereignty of France in
all parts of the Union of Indo-China” was violated by Japanese conduct.205
This was because the French only signed the agreement “when faced with
an actual invasion”.206 Using coercion to vitiate consent was no doubt fair
200
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and accurate in the circumstances, but the failure to register that “French”
Indochina, indeed Allied authority over much of the Third World, was
brought about by legally comparable processes is striking. Again here,
ICL operated like the chicotte in the Congo: as an openly discriminatory
instrument of power to be used in the very construction of a (global) social
order.207
Other parallels with colonialism emerged throughout WWII trials,
sometimes explicitly. For instance, when Allied prosecutors quizzed
Hermann Göring about lebensraum, the political concept that served as a
pretext for Nazi expansionism, Göring snidely remarked: “I fully
understand that the four signatory powers [to the Charter] who call three
quarters of the world their own explain the idea differently.”208 Likewise,
even the U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, could not shake
off the uncomfortable parallel between his cases against German
industrialists for pillaging natural resources like coal, oil, and manganese
from Occupied Europe and comparable colonial practices, the likes of
which had so horrified Joseph Conrad and others. In a letter to President
Truman written during the Nuremberg process, Jackson remarked glibly,
“we are prosecuting plunder and our allies are practicing it.”209 And to
square the circle, in defending Klaus Barbie before French courts for his
wartime participation in Nazi atrocities, the notorious lawyer Jacques
Verge’s procès de rupture entailed a detailed parallel between the
allegations against Barbie in wartime Lyon and colonial atrocities in a
number of the prosecuting state’s former colonies, including “French
Indochina.”210
We tie the criminal law doctrine that currently exists in much of
the world to these histories of parochialism, imposition by power, and
hypocrisy in application. Without suggesting that the relation is inevitable
or constant, even in post-colonial states, these histories warn against a fast
assumption that allowing modern ICL to reabsorb extant criminal law
doctrine is somehow noble, liberal, respectful or functionally optimal. To
be sure, there are important discontinuities between the operation of
association de malfaiteurs in the Congo and conspiracy at Tokyo, most
notably, the absence of massive guilt on the part of the Congolese people.
207
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Nonetheless, association de malfaiteurs in the Congo and conspiracy at
post-war tribunals probably overlap more than they diverge. In both
instances, these inchoate crimes were foreign and therefore alienating
(replicating Leipzig); both crimes were applied in a highly discriminatory
fashion to construct a social order by force rather than popular approval,
and both were applied in such a way that they occasioned important
human rights violations. The contexts are entirely different, but certain
themes emerge from both. When faced with these commonalities, scholars
and practitioners of modern ICL may wish to distance themselves from
doctrine born of these ugly histories. To do this, they will have to rethink
ICL in ways that better reflect a plurality of political interests and social
values, perhaps in a way that solves the sorts of dilemmas that arose with
procedure post WWI, instead of just managing doctrinal diversity once a
norm is formally anointed somewhere as binding law.
IV. MODES OF ATTRIBUTION
In our typology’s second element, we ask whether criminal law
doctrine transplanted into recipient legal systems outside formal
colonialism might also upset criminal law doctrine’s capacity to act as a
marker for underlying social values within the polity it serves, again
making doctrine an unreliable proxy for value diversity. As we pointed out
by way of introduction, the literature on legal transplants is voluminous,211
and suggests that legal transplants of these sorts seldom “work.” If
Argentina was our illustration of an instance where it did work, and WWI
a qualification of what it means to “work” for ICL, we are still concerned
that in a number of instances, local communities will prove “unreceptive”
to transposed criminal law doctrine, meaning that the recipient society is
“unable to give meaning to the law.”212 In this Part, we seize on modes of
attribution within national and international law to highlight these
concerns, again cautioning against a fast shift from a descriptive version
of Legal Pluralism that plots interacting normativity to a prescriptive
alternative that uses existing laws as the building blocks of a defensible
system of global governance.
Modes of attribution – like aiding and abetting, superior
211

The locus classicus is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
(1974). For an extremely impressive earlier work, that treated law
less specifically as a component of sociological imitation across cultures generally, see
GABRIEL DE TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Worthington Clews Parsons trans.,
Henry Holt & Co. 1903) (1895).
212
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 179 (2003).
COMPARATIVE LAW

2017]

THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM

51

responsibility, and joint criminal enterprise – attribute criminal harm to
individual agency.213 In this section, we emphasize the history of modes of
attribution in two inter-connected legal systems, one national the other
international. To reiterate our wider method, an analysis at both levels is
essential to unpacking the ahistoricism of Legal Pluralism in ICL since
power decoupled the relationship between ICL and a genuine plurality of
social and cultural values by first distorting the national criminal law ICL
often draws on, then by subjecting ICL itself to the same sword.
Moreover, to reiterate lessons learned from attempts at accountability
after WWI, unconditional surrender to the diversity of doctrine may
undermine the probability of meaningful justice. In our national example
of these dynamics, we explain how Japan came to adopt German modes of
attribution through these dynamics. We show how virtually all of modern
Japanese criminal law doctrine – not just modes of attribution – was
initially imported from the West through varying degrees of coercion. In
the second section, we study the modern mode of attribution called Joint
Criminal Enterprise (JCE) within ad hoc ICL tribunals. That doctrine
claims a history rooted in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as well as
multiple national criminal systems around the world. Yet a deeper
historical analysis suggests that JCE is actually the product of a very
selective reading of ICL and national criminal law that privileges a minute
sample of Western understandings of criminal responsibility. In short, our
study of the law of modes of attribution shows yet another means by
which criminal doctrine is imposed coercively on states, and another
instance where a modern set of ICL institutions ingest this imbalanced
history.
213
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German Modes of Attribution in Japan

For the uninitiated, there is something very peculiar about modes
of attribution in modern Japanese criminal law—they are strikingly
German. Leafing through the leading English-language text on Japanese
criminal law, Shigemitsu Dando’s The Criminal Law of Japan: The
General Part, one is immediately struck by the enormous influence of
German criminal law and theory.214 The word “German” appears sixtyseven times in the text, and “Germany” appears slightly more frequently.
The text is also replete with references to leading theories within German
criminal law, from Welzel’s theory of action to Roxin’s theory of
perpetration;215 the book contains literally hundreds of references to
German theorists. As the author himself acknowledges in the preface to
the English translation, “I have been strongly influenced on a number of
points by German penal law theory, which tends to be true of most of the
body of criminal law scholars in Japan.”216
Unsurprisingly then, when one turns to Japanese modes of
attribution in particular, the text reveals a variety of features quite alien to
Anglo-American systems that mirror German criminal law and theory
more or less precisely.217 Thus, if one looked to Japanese criminal law to
determine the scope of complicity in order to interpret the concept in
customary ICL (as one international criminal tribunal recently did),218 or
214
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to ascertain the ways in which ICL (applied in national legal systems)
constrains the global trade in weaponry, one recognizes the distinctive
mark of German criminal law immediately. How could this be so?
Accomplice liability is constructed very differently from one legal system
to another,219 and Germany never colonized Japan. Perhaps Japanese
scholars and legislators were moved by the undeniable analytical elegance
of German criminal law, or by pure happenstance, German ideas about
social order, crime and punishment meshed well with underlying
ideological pre-commitments in Japan. While both these hypotheses are
probably partially true, history reveals a slightly darker explanation that
again unsettles the view that extant doctrine is a necessary repository of
social and cultural diversity to be safeguarded and preserved
internationally—perhaps German criminal law was forced upon the
Japanese?
The uptake of German criminal law in Japan began during the
reign of the Emperor Meiji in the late 19th century, when the country
reshaped its legal system to mirror Western norms.220 From the seventh
century until the Meiji reforms, Japanese law was based on Chinese
thought,221 and criminal justice was administered through the Shogunate
and its officials.222 The impetus to shift to a more European system came
Dando’s text to report Japanese standards that were strikingly similar to those applicable
in Germany. This, once again, is an example of the normative inter-penetration we
identify here. See Šainović supra note 4, at ¶ 1645 n.5416 (discussing Japanese law of
complicity in the context of its rejection of “specific direction” as an element of
complicity in customary international law). Aside from the fact that Japanese criminal
law allows dolus eventualis as the lowest mental element for complicity, as the ICTY
recognizes, Japanese criminal law also involves a differentiated system of participation
with limited derivative liability, mandatory mitigation of sentences for accomplices, a
distinction between co-perpetration and complicity, and a control theory to delineate
between the two. All of these features are consistent with German criminal law theory
and few conform with Anglo-American principles.
219
For a comparative overview of theories of complicity, see James G. Stewart,
Complicity, in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (forthcoming) (Markus Dubber &
Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014).
220
See DANDO, supra note 214, at 34–35; Sally Engle Merry, Colonial and Postcolonial
Law, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 569, 570 (Austin Sarat, ed.,
2004).
221
Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 1, 23 (Wilhelm
Röhl, ed., 2004).
222
Yoshiro Hiramatsu, Tokugawa Law, 14 LAW IN JAP. 1, 48 (1981). Instead of rendering
individuals equal, the Shogunate system depended on hierarchies of status and therefore
reinforced the role of central administration through the Emperor. See Dan Henderson,
Introduction to the Kujikata Osademegaki (1742), in HO TO KEIBATSU NO REKISHI-TEKI
KOSATSU [HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF LAW AND PUNISHMENT] MEMORIAL ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF DR HIRAMATSU YOSHIRO (1987), quoted in MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 59 (2d ed. 2002).
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after Western military powers forced the Tokugawa Shogunate to open
Japan up to international trade.223 In this respect, the Japanese experience
was consistent with those we identify in the DRC and Pakistan. As
Antony Anghie has eloquently explained, “[i]t is hardly controversial that
one of the primary driving forces of nineteenth-century colonial expansion
was trade.”224 Japan, however, was able to avoid the ignominy of physical
occupation by complying with European standards for transnational trade
in order to win international recognition and assert itself as a sovereign
state on an international stage.225 In other words, the litmus test for the
type of international recognition that would forestall formal colonial rule,
known as standards of civilization, demanded that states like Japan create
“idealized European standards in both their external and, more
significantly, internal relations.”226
Initially, Japanese officials resisted this path. Prior to the fullblown assumption of European law, foreign trading companies arrogated
to themselves more and more influence over local administration,
precisely in order to create an environment most conducive to their
economic expansion.227 These nominally independent companies operated
in tandem with colonial governments to press Japan into assuming a raft
of unequal treaty obligations, which ceded an important set of powers to
the foreign colonial powers and/or companies under the direct threat of
military action. The resulting unequal treaties granted foreign states –
including the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and the Netherlands –
a number of important privileges:228 Japan was no longer entitled to
control its monetary system, regulate tariffs or trade, or determine where

223

After the Opium War, in 1854 and 1855, the United States, followed by Great Britain,
Russia, and the Netherlands, all concluded treaties with the Shogunate that granted a
number of privileges to the states and their nationals. These initial treaties were quickly
supplanted by even more unequal treaties that allowed additional states to have
extraterritorial rights and jurisdiction for indefinite periods of time. Ram Prakash Anand,
Family of “Civilized” States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, Defiance
and Confrontation, 5 J HIST. INT’L L. 1, 9–14 (2005).
224
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 67 (2007).
225
Id. at 91.
226
Id. at 84.
227
Id. at 84–85.
228
MICHAEL R. AUSLIN, NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM: THE UNEQUAL TREATIES AND
THE CULTURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY 1–8 (2006). Auslin notes that while the treaties
were unequal, the foreign powers did not engage in the usual form of colonialism that
involved territorial dominance and the exclusion of other potential competitor colonial
nations. Instead, the treaties served as means of regulating both relations with Japan as
well as with each other.
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foreigners settled within Japanese territory.229 Moreover, foreign powers
established consular jurisdictions with enforcement powers within Japan,
displacing the Japanese judiciary.230
In 1868, the loss of sovereign control in the consular jurisdictions
contributed to a revolution that restored the Emperor Meiji.231 In order to
reassert Japanese jurisdiction and appease the Japanese citizens who saw
foreign legal control of Japan as a major affront, the new Meiji
government decided to impose “standards of civilization” upon itself as a
lesser evil that would at least ward off formal colonial rule.232 Thus, the
Japanese did to their own legal system what colonialism would have
achieved anyway. In this way, the Japanese government developed a legal
system that was more amenable to the Western powers, thereby obviating
the need for the foreign consular jurisdiction that had proved so deeply
offensive that it destabilized the entire political regime.233 Given the value
of criminal law as a vehicle for protecting trade and reinforcing fragile
governmental authority, not to mention the desire to appease their colonial
interlocutors, the Japanese quickly looked to European criminal codes for
inspiration. Thus began the process that saw Japanese professors of
criminal law learning German most earnestly.
Initially, Japan adopted both the French Napoleonic Penal Code
(1880) and the Code of Criminal Instruction (1880), both of which had
proved a favorite export of French colonial rule.234 The initial adoption of
French law in Japan was mostly a matter of expedience—the Japanese
needed an existing body of law that was not burdened by case law and
they needed it quickly. As a result, the French codes were translated into
Japanese criminal law verbatim.235 This first experiment with European
models was short-lived, however. After only a very brief period in effect,
229

CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16–17
(2d rev. ed. 2008). Similar treaties were found in other Asian countries as well, including
China. See GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 14–35 (1984).
230
GOODMAN, supra note 229, at 21.
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SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 8
(2011).
232
TAKII KAZUHIRO, THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE OF THE WEST
AND THE SHAPING OF THE MODERN STATE 5 (David Noble trans., International House of
Japan ed. 2007) (2003).
233
Karl-Friedrich Lenz, Penal Law, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, supra note
221, at 607, 609–10. Evidently, the need for internal legal reform within Japan to remove
Western jurisdiction quickly became the focal point of Japanese politics during the
period. See GEORGE BAILEY SANSOM, THE WESTERN WORLD AND JAPAN: A STUDY IN
THE INTERACTION OF EUROPEAN AND ASIATIC CULTURES 378–85 (1950).
234
Röhl, supra note 221, at 24.
235
Id. at 23 – 24.
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the French-based code came to be perceived as overly liberal, and
incapable of legitimating the structure and values of the imperial
regime.236 In looking for European alternatives, the Japanese found that
German law was not only viewed as more advanced than French law,237
but the German code appeared especially relevant to the Japanese context:
Germany was a relatively new nation, trying to create a federation out of a
monarchical system of government while reconciling historical and
customary practice with statutory law.238 And most importantly, the
German code still enjoyed the necessary European pedigree.
Therefore, the influence of French law in Japan was soon
superseded by a new, German-based Meiji Constitution and criminal
code.239 As a result of this switch in legal affiliations, Japanese law as a
whole is now a mixture of a number of foreign influences: German law
was deeply mixed with French practice along with the earlier Chinese
influence.240 The criminal law, however, clearly followed the German
path. As we mention earlier, if one even browses leading Japanese
criminal law texts or compare the structure of core modes of attribution
like complicity, Japanese criminal law is shot through with German
thinking.241 As Markus Dubber has joked in irony, “the sun never sets on
German criminal theory.”242 Japan is clearly an important ingredient in
making this proposition true.
While Japan both accepted and felt compelled to adopt German
criminal law prior to the Second World War, the process of transplantation
contrasted starkly with the force of American legal influences during the
236

Ronald Frank, Civil Code, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, supra note 221,
at 166, 178 – 179. See also MATSUI, supra note 231, at 9.
237
Frank, supra note 236, at 183.
238
Id. at 182–86. The other important aspect of German law was the conservative nature
of its constitution, which allowed for the establishment of institutions of governance that
were subordinate and answerable to the Emperor. The subsequent adoption of Germanic
codes was a natural result of adopting this constitution. Anand, supra note 223, at 18.
239
Which concentrated political power in the Emperor. Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of
Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law 1868 – 1961, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 6−12 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ed., 1963). See
also MATSUI, supra note 231, at 9−13. There had been a momentary hesitation when
British parliamentary democracy had been proposed instead of the German model. The
debate ended when the leading proponent of the British model, Okuma Shigenobu, was
expelled from Parliament for opposing a suspicious sale of government assets on
preferential terms. See Joyce Chapman Lebra, Okuma Shigenobu and the 1881 Political
Crisis, 18 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 475 (1959).
240
DEAN, supra note 222, at 71.
241
See, e.g., DANDO, supra note 214
242
Dubber, supra note 18, at 1298 Dubber points to the strong influence of German
criminal law in Spain, Latin America, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Greece, Poland and
Turkey.
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postwar occupation. The new American-authored Japanese Constitution
was subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
(SCAP), whose orders could not be constitutionally challenged.243 By this
point, the American occupying forces were reforming virtually every
aspect of Japanese law, including substantive criminal law and criminal
procedure.244 This episode of reform added another layer of foreign
influence onto the long history of supplanting Japanese “patterns of
knowing, feeling, and acting”245 about criminal punishment with foreign
alternatives that furthered outside interests. Nonetheless, while
Americanization would further dilute the concentration of Japanese
cultural norms in national criminal law, the Japanese law governing
complicity today suggests that these American changes were insufficient
to dislodge the prior German influence.
Overall, this set of multiple reforms and revisions led to a system
of criminal law whose connection to Japanese societal values was filtered
through layers of foreign law. We do not argue that these outside
influences necessarily negate the possibility of a correlation between
societal values and German-inspired criminal law in contemporary Japan
including on the topic of complicity—the Japanese people may have come
to adopt these foreign doctrine as their own in much the same way that
one has some difficulty walking through the streets of Islamabad without
interrupting games of cricket. German criminal law may well be in Japan
what Spanish criminal procedure is in Argentina. Indeed, we believe that
there is every possibility that this is true given the passage of time, the
number of legal reforms since and the reality that Japanese forcibly
introduced German criminal law to other Asian nation-states, mostly
notably, South Korea.246 Still, we express concern that a prescriptive
243

The bulk of the post-war Constitution was drafted in a matter of days primarily by
American legal experts, before its rapid acceptance in Japan. See Robert E. Ward, The
Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980 (1956); and,
ALFRED C OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN (1972). See also, Lenz, supra
note 233, at 622–23. As for the higher constitutional status of the SCAP, the Supreme
Court of Japan made this ruling. See MATSUI, supra note 231, at 27.
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See OPPLER, supra note 243, at 136 (describing the reform of criminal procedure law
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GARLAND, supra note 15.
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Markus Dubber, for instance, notes the influence of German criminal law on both
South Korea and Japan. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in
German Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 679 (2005); The influence is such that
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variant of Legal Pluralism should just assume this relation automatically
in light of a history that, on its face, would seem to point in the opposite
direction. And even if this apprehension proves unfounded, what of
Leipzig?
Put differently, when the ICTY draws on the Japanese criminal
law governing complicity to define the equivalent concept in ICL,247 their
method is undeniably plural as a matter of doctrine, but it does not
necessarily add the diversity that ICL lacks and which pluralism is
supposed to furnish. Nor is respecting all doctrinal arrangements because
they reflect underlying social values inevitably functionally desirable for
ICL. Consequently, deferring to and then managing the diversity of extant
legal doctrine throughout the world does not lead inexorably to
meaningful pluralism, nor the type of diversity that will give effect to
value pluralism or cosmopolitan aspirations for international criminal
justice. Doctrinal pluralism is thus a shaky foundation for global Legal
Pluralism in any field, even where colonialism was never formally
achieved.

B.

Double-Counting Joint Criminal Enterprise in Ad Hoc International
Tribunals

Forms of participation in international crimes are highly
doctrinally plural within international courts, but when scrutinized
historically, their ability to claim a diversity of values is also weak. The
wide array of forms of attribution that might apply to international crimes
before ad hoc tribunals in the former-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia and
Sierra Leone, really reflect the dominant influence of a very few national
systems. At every step, these tribunals subjected defendants to standards
of responsibility that draw on the history of national criminal law we have
pointed to above. In other words, the history of forms of participation in
these institutions is largely in step with, not an exception to, the dynamics
we point out in global criminal law doctrine. Using history as our method
and technique, we scratch the surface of one mode of attribution in ad hoc
Tribunals, namely Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”), to illuminate this
reality.
United States, prior to George Fletcher. See Paul Ryu, Contemporary Problems of
Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170 (1957); Paul Ryu, Causation in Criminal
Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773 (1957); Paul Ryu, Discussion of Structure and Theory, 24
THE AM. J. OF COMP. L. 602 (1976).
247
See infra note 218.
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Before we get to JCE in ad hoc tribunals, we pause to briefly
observe its absence at Nuremberg or Tokyo. After the St James
Declaration, in which the Allies promised punishment for atrocities “of
those who ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them,”248 the
Allies established what was first known as the Inter-Allied Conference on
the Punishment of War Crimes.249 The body, later renamed a Commission,
busied itself with issues of law for the international trials it envisioned,
including the question of law governing the attribution of criminal
responsibility. The Commission even issued a questionnaire to states on
the topic, although the project of consolidating responses was soon
abandoned. Where discussions did continue, they tended to focus almost
obsessively on the issue of superior orders, but forms of attribution were
also a frequent agenda item. On this topic, Professor Lauterpacht tabled a
report recommending that “every case, as it would arise in war crimes
trials, be solved on the basis of general principles of penal law, and that
individual responsibility be determined in ascertaining the existence of the
mens rea of the accused.”250
Curiously, Lauterpacht’s idea of general principles appears to have
carried the day at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Although the Charters of both
tribunals explicitly enumerated different forms of attribution,251 the
Nuremberg Tribunal itself merely considered whether an accused was
“concerned in,” “connected with”, “inculpated in” or “implicated in”

248

INTER-ALLIED INFORMATION COMMITTEE, PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES—THE
INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION SIGNED AT ST. JAMES’S PALACE LONDON ON 13TH JANUARY
AND RELATIVE DOCUMENTS 15 (1942). For discussion of the significance of the
declaration, see TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 25 (2013), and MAGUIRE, supra note 179, at
67 (rev. ed. 2010).
249
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89 (1948).
250
Id. at 277. Lauterpacht later published his submissions to the UN War Crimes
Commission. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War
Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 73 (1944). In addition, he also argued that general
principles of criminal law should form the basis of war crimes, which he argued “may de
defined as such offences against the law of war as are criminal in the ordinary and
accepted sense of fundamental rules of warfare and of general principles of criminal
law.” Id., at 79.
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Art. 6(3) of the Nuremberg Charter reads: “Leaders, organizers, instigators and
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed
by any persons in execution of such plan.” Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter].
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international crimes.252 As many leading commentators now accept, this
approach entailed what Europeans call a unitary theory of perpetration,253
which does not disaggregate forms of attribution into formal legal
concepts like aiding and abetting, superior responsibility or JCE. To the
modern international criminal lawyer, the refusal to differentiate between
forms of attribution like this will appear either fringe or antiquated, but in
fact, the abundance of differentiated systems of blame attribution
throughout the many systems of criminal law around the globe largely has
colonialism to thank: with the partial exception of Italy, the European
states that had adopted a unitary theory like that employed at Nuremberg
and Tokyo were never colonial powers.254 England, France, Spain and
Germany, on the other hand, all adopted the differentiated system ICL
lawyers know best.
Aside from this brief glimpse into the prehistory of modes of
attribution at Nuremberg, it is also important to appreciate that the
doctrinal variety of modes of attribution used to prosecute international
crimes after WWII was probably massive. Just with respect to zonal trials
held by each of the occupying powers in Germany after WWII, the
Americans prosecuted 1,885 alleged war crimes;255 French military
tribunals convicted 2,107 individuals (and staged numerous other trials
252

For an overview of these cases, see 15 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, 49–58 (1947). Like Hector Olásolo, we conclude that this amounts to a
unitary theory of perpetration insofar as it fails to distinguish modes of participation. See
OLÁSOLO ET AL., THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY
LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 21 (2010).
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KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 1:
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require a causal contribution to a certain criminal result, thereby opting for a unitarian
concept of perpetration (Einheitstäterschaft). As will be seen below, the jurisprudence
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ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 781 (2002) (“for supranational
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Tribunals”).
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This countries include Denmark, Norway, Austria, Italy, Poland and Brazil. See
generally, James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes,
25 LEIDEN. J. INT’L. L. 165, 170 (2012). For a history of the rise of the unitary theory of
perpetration, including the Union International de Droit Pénal’s endorsement of it in
1902, see James G. Stewart, The Strangely Familiar History of the Unitary Theory of
Perpetration, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MIRJAN DAMAŚKA, (forthcoming 2015).
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David Fraser, Shadows of Law, Shadows of the Shoah: Towards a Legal History of the
Nazi Killing Machine, 32 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 401, 414 (2011).
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within France and French North Africa);256 the British tried 1,085
crimes;257 and the Russians – by then no strangers to the value of the
criminal trial as a means of authoritarian control – staged a number in
Russian-occupied Germany that historians cannot quantify.258 Therefore,
even leaving aside these Russian prosecutions,259 there were at least 5,077
trials held within the WWII zonal trials, creating a very large class of
standards of law to synthesize in the quest for “common principles.”
Indeed, outside the zones occupied by the victorious Allied nations, the
historian István Deak reports “up to 2 to 3 percent of the population
formerly under German occupation… was charged by national courts for
what was alternatively, or often simultaneously, termed collaboration with
the enemy, treason, and war crimes”.260 In Europe alone, then, state
practice on questions of criminal participation in atrocity was
gargantuan.261
256

Id.
Id.
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Id. If one considers trials held by East German Courts, then there were 12,766
convictions alone during from 1945 – 1955. Soviet tribunals themselves prosecuted an
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Against this background, we now introduce JCE and critically
retrace its passage into received understandings of customary ICL via ad
hoc tribunals. According to these tribunals, JCE has three strands. The
“basic” form occurs where “co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common
design, possess the same criminal purpose.”262 The second “systematic”
form of joint criminal enterprise is a mere subset of the “basic” form, and
adds little of great salience for present purposes,263 mostly because it also
requires that the participants in the enterprise harbor the necessary intent
to commit the crime. Under the third variant (JCE III), however, all
participants in a joint criminal enterprise are responsible for crimes
committed beyond those agreed, provided they are “a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.”264 Thus, the soldier
manning the door is also convicted of torturing the victim, even if he
believed he was guarding the entry to prevent enemy soldiers from
entering and only foresaw that one of his confederates might commit
torture.265
How did the doctrine infiltrate international law? The Charters of
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals had referenced liability based on a

262

Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 196. Note that this language is not always
consistent. See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 97 (Int’l
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In fact, there is good authority for the idea that the standard is actually objective
foreseeability, lowering the mental element required for JCEIII even further. See Elies
van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for
Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 184 (2007) (arguing that whether members of a JCE
must comply with the full mens rea of genocide turns on whether they are perpetrators or
participants), and, Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under
the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 121 (2007)
(arguing that it is a logical impossibility for someone who does not have the necessary
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“common plan,”266 which laid the foundation for JCE in modern ICL, but
as we saw a moment ago, the Tribunals did not apply it as such. Likewise,
JCE was hardly a common element of all of the very many trials that
followed WWII, in Europe or beyond. The negotiating history of the
Nuremberg Charter points to a familiar answer to the riddle of its
emergence in ICL. In a trans-Atlantic discussion on the topic of criminal
responsibility that was held in early 1945,267 no lesser personality than
Justice Robert Jackson opined that international law was “indefinite and
weak” in the area of criminal liability.268 Jackson went on to argue that, as
a consequence of this frail foundation, the task of defining these issues
within the Charter “fulfills in a sense the function of legislation.”269 As to
the content of this new legislation, he concluded that “there is greater
liberty in us to declare principles as we see them now”.270 Needless to say,
the “we” in his remarks hardly reflected the views of a meaningful crosssection of a global polity.
The notion of “common purpose” that the Allies freely injected into
the Nuremberg and then Tokyo Charters during this process derived from
complicated debates about conspiracy. We have addressed the partial
absorption and application of conspiracy earlier,271 and here we add only
one point of great salience for JCE in particular. According to wellreviewed historical records,272 the conspiracy debate involved a seemingly
constant oscillation between conspiracy (an inchoate separate crime in its
own right as we saw earlier) and common purpose liability (a means of
participating in a consummated offense i.e. a mode of attribution). The
slippage between these two very different concepts was nowhere more
evident than in the report of American Lieutenant Colonel Murray C.
Bernay, whose recommendations to President Roosevelt in September
1944 are widely regarded as the genesis of common purpose liability and,
by derivation, the modern notion of JCE.273
Once again, the method of absorption would prove revealing. When
the famed Tadić appeal judgment decided whether the ICTY Statute
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Nuremberg Charter, supra note 251.
JACKSON, supra note 188, at 331.
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See infra section II.B.
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See Bush, supra note 181.
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Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 113 (2005) (discussing Bernay’s major contribution to the
development of JCE); ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-30 (2012) (same); and, CIARA DAMGAARD, INDIVIDUAL
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 132 (2008) (same).
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(implicitly) included JCE a.k.a common plan liability, it seized upon only
portions of this history and a small subset of favorable Anglo-American
criminal law.
This choice created three conspicuous problems. First, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber made no mention of the unitary theory of perpetration
applied at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and in subsequent cases. In other words,
aside from pointing to the common plan doctrine that was formally
included in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, the Chamber ignored
most everything in the judgments. If, as most experts agree, these two
prior tribunals had applied a unitary theory of perpetration, the leap to JCE
in Tadić makes the Nuremberg standards “legal bastard cousins in the
family’s juridical closet.”274 Yet a system that purports to ground its forms
of criminal attribution in a venerable lineage of customary international
law within international courts and tribunals is undermined by illegitimate
offspring like these.275
Second, the sources the Tadić Appeals Judgment drew upon in
turning away from the unitary theory were obtained from an extremely
selective preference for certain Western standards. Faced with a tidal
wave of disparate modes of attribution for international crimes that were
suddenly pushed to the surface in the immediate post-war context, the
Tadić decision cited just ten cases as supporting JCE. The choice was
illuminating, as much for the origins of the cases cited as their meager
sample size: six of the cases were drawn from British military courts
established after WWII;276 one stemmed from a Canadian military court in
274

The historian David Fraser eloquently criticizes international criminal lawyers for
sometimes drawing implausible lines between historical phenomena that may be
unconnected, mostly out of a desire to justify that which currently exists. Fraser, supra
note 255, at 9. In structure, this argument resembles that which Samuel Moyn makes in
international human rights law. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY (2010).
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Fraser, supra note 255, at 9.
276
Trial of Otto Sandrock and three others, British Military Court for the Trial of War
Criminals, held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland (Nov. 24–26, 1945), reprinted in 1
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES,
LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35 (1947); Trial of Gustav Alfred
Jepsen and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Luneberg, Germany (Aug.
13–23, 1946), Judgement of 24 August 1946; Trial of Franz Schonfeld and others, British
Military Court, Essen, June 11th-26th, 1946, reprinted in 11 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 68 (1947) (summing up of the Judge Advocate); Trial of Feurstein
and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Hamburg, Germany (Aug. 4–24,
1948), Judgement of 24 August 1948; Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, (Dec. 18–19 and 21–22, 1945),
reprinted in 1 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS
AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 88, 91 (1947); Trial of
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occupied Germany;277 two from the United States Tribunal convened
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10;278 and, a small series of national
Italian cases. Despite the evident limitations in quantum and
representation of these sources, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić cited the
familiar but false notion, inspired from Lauterpacht, Wechsler and many
others in between, that JCE was “[i]n line with recognized principles
common to all civilized legal systems.”279 To the (limited) extent that the
claim was true of criminal law doctrine, it was only so because of a
double-counting of English criminal law: once in the metropole, then
several times again within former colonies the parent system had
constructed in its own image.
If this sample of case law fell short of establishing the universality
claimed, the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s subsequent treatment of national
legislation only exacerbated the earlier methodological shortcoming. The
Appeals Chamber in Tadić went on to reason that “international criminal
rules on common purpose [i.e. JCE] are substantially rooted in, and to a
large extent reflect, a position taken by many States of the world in their
national legal systems.”280 But here too, the countries the Appeals
Chamber pointed to as substantiating their thesis included just “England
and Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia and Zambia.”281 In
conjunction with the difficulties with the selection of case law, this limited
legislative survey renders this aspect of ICL in ad hoc tribunals almost
inseparable from criminal law developed for the British
Commonwealth.282 The two histories come apart slightly, and certainly
not enough to sooth worries that legal pluralism risks sanctifying
principles conceived in British imperialism.
Josef Kramer and 44 others ("Belsen Case"), British Military Court, Luneberg, Sept. 17 –
Nov. 17, 1945, reprinted in 2 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST
OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,1.
277
Hoelzer et al., Canadian Military Court, Aurich, Germany, 1 RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS 25 MAR-6 APRIL 1946, 341, 347, 349 (RCAF Binder 181.009 (D2474)).
278
The United States of America v. Otto Ohlenforf et al., reprinted in 4 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10 3 (1951); and, Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine others,
General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, (Nov.
15– Dec. 13, 1945), reprinted in 11 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 5
(1947).
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Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 200.
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Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 193.
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Id., at ¶ 224.
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See Martin Friedland, Codification in the Commonwealth: Earlier Efforts, 2 CRIM.
L.F. 145, 150 (1990); Simon Coldham, Criminal Justice Policies in Commonwealth
Africa: Trends and Prospects (2000) 44 J. AFR. L. 218, 223–28, 230–35.
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Ironically, the same dangers are evident within judicial opposition to
JCE. If the Appeals Chamber had included laws governing criminal
attribution from non-British colonial powers, it might have come to a very
different conclusion about JCE’s existence in customary ICL. French law,
for example, did not contemplate the doctrine, and given the histories we
have gestured to, this reality suggests that numerically speaking, many
other modern criminal law systems throughout the world do not contain it
either. In an eerie reminder of this point, a decision of the Extraordinary
Criminal Chambers of Cambodia (ECCC) rejecting one component of
JCE pointed to the fact that the doctrine did not exist in Cambodian
criminal law. As authority for this proposition, the ECCC cited a French
text on the Cambodian Projet de Nouveau Code Pénal, which explained
Cambodian modes of attribution in terms that reflected French concepts
par excellence. Historically speaking, this was entirely unremarkable—
French criminal law was introduced into Cambodia as early as 1929 and
remains the dominant influence to this day.283 To revisit a recurring
uncomfortable parallel, however, modern Cambodia was then subsumed
within “French Indo-China.”284
So even if the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić took the absence of
JCE in Cambodian criminal law into consideration as legal pluralists
would implore, doing so could just engender a double-counting contest
between colonial influences without necessarily honoring anything
particular about Cambodians’ “patterns of knowing, feeling, and
acting.”285 Even if it did, the question would still remain whether honoring
this incarnation of criminal doctrine makes sense for ICL in its attempts to
speak to a wider constituency. In other words, in the first instance,
managing conflicts between global criminal law risks adjudicating
contests between competing colonial artifacts, taking us further away from
the plurality of social, cultural and political values Legal Pluralism should
seek to promote (if it is to shift away from its purely descriptive roots). In
283

Phann Vanrath, The Basics of Substantial Cambodian Criminal Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO CAMBODIAN LAW 198, 201 (Hor Peng, Kong Phallack, & Jörg
Menzel, eds., 2010) (noting as well that French criminal law was in force in Cambodia
since 1929 and that the 2009 code was drafted jointly by Cambodian officials and French
experts).
284
To take the parallel a step deeper, Jörg Menzel reports that the post-Khmer Rouge
reconstruction of Cambodia’s legal system resulted in a ‘mixed civil law’ system, where
much of the kingdom’s civil law is now Japanese in nature, but its criminal law remains
French. Jörg Menzel, Cambodian Law: Some Comparative and International
Perspectives, in INTRODUCTION TO CAMBODIAN LAW, ibid at 477, 482. We know how the
French influence came about, and can only hazard a guess at how the Japanese civil law
still accompanies it.
285
GARLAND, supra note 15.
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the second, it presumes that genuflecting to extant standards is best, which
Leipzig tells us may or may not be the case.
With respect to JCE, it is hard to view the catalogue of sources
relied upon by the Appeals Chamber in adopting the doctrine as reflecting
any real degree of inclusive, plural, cosmopolitan values, but the same is
true (to a lesser extent) of the ECCC decision rejecting it. Thus, to claim
that modes of attribution for ICL crimes are doctrinally plural within a
diverse, conflicting, sometimes inter-penetrating system of criminal law is
empirically undeniable, what William Twining calls “Social Fact Legal
Pluralism,”286 but to take a normative position about the desirability of
that diversity in the name of Legal Pluralism or any other theoretical
system risks turning a blind eye to the troubling history that generated the
doctrinal diversity, and ultimately, begs the question about what the
standard should be.
V. CRIMINAL OFFENSES
In this Part, we turn to in the special part of ICL to illustrate the
third element of our typology: instances where societies are not only
“unreceptive” to transposed criminal law doctrine but when a foreign
imposition contaminates surrounding law too. In this third element, we
again question whether it can safely be said that the definition of crimes
necessarily correspond to popular values. We have chosen two laws
whose criminalization would seem inevitable given the respective social
contexts. In the first section, we look at the process by which blasphemy
became a crime in the ‘Islamized’ law of Muslim-majority Pakistan.
While the inclusion of this crime would seem almost unavoidable, it was
in fact a British colonial-era crime that soon became what Gunther
Teubner calls a “legal irritant.” 287 In the international context, we study
colonialism and apartheid. Apartheid would seem to be one of the most
obvious international crimes, given its sordid and tragic history in South
Africa. Yet the process by which it was eventually criminalized in the ICC
Statute was littered with obstruction, mainly from Western states, and
even now the status and definition of the norm is unclear. This would
seem to represent another scenario where the norm bears little connection
to social values, and instead communicates the preferences of a small
number of influential states. Again, these histories suggest that formal
laws are not water-tight vessels capable of carrying the full diversity a
prescriptive account of pluralism ought to value.
286
287

Twining, supra note 33.
Teubner, supra note 31.

2017]

THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM

A.

68

Blasphemy as a “Legal Irritant” in Pakistan

International courts and tribunals occasionally draw on Pakistani
criminal law as part of the surveys of national criminal law they undertake
to ground their readings of ICL norms. In the Čelebići judgment, for
instance, an ICTY Trial Chamber analyzed various national laws
governing the mental element required for murder, concluding that
“[u]nder Canadian law, the accused is required to have a simultaneous
awareness of the probability of death and the intention to inflict some
form of serious harm, and this is also the position in Pakistan.”288
Pakistani criminal law also features in other international courts and
tribunals,289 in one instance, when an international court cited to the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 to substantiate its position.290 In fact, the
British used the IPC as a template for most all their colonial territories; it
was implemented verbatim in countries as diverse as Uganda, Singapore
and Australia, without calibration to local circumstances.291 Citing the IPC
as Pakistani criminal law is only one of the ways that ICL and national
criminal law interface, but it invites a deeper inquiry into the quality of the
national law harnessed to demonstrate ICL’s inclusive, pluralistic, or
cosmopolitan credentials.
Once again, the effect of colonialism on Pakistani criminal offences
undermines the assumption that legal doctrine necessarily reflects diverse
cultural value; unfortunately, Pakistani criminal law fares no better against
British colonialism than our earlier examples of the Franco-Belgian
influence on Congolese notions of inchoate crime or the influence of
German criminal law on Japanese concepts of blame attribution. In all
these instances, we seem far from the Argentine experience with criminal
288

Prosecutor v Delalić et al, No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 434 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)..
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Bagosora, supra note 4, at n.1680. See also, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 454 n.1160 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (drawing on Pakistani criminal law, and many other national
definitions, to interpret the scope of rape).
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Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 454
n.1160 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
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Uganda received the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Criminal Procedure Code in 1897
and 1902 respectively. See Henry Francis Morris, “A History of the Adoption of Codes
of Criminal Law and Procedure in British Colonial Africa, 1876 − 1935” (1974) 18 J.
Afr. L. 6, 6 – 7. For discussion of the IPC’s transmission to Singapore, see BARRY
WRIGHT, STANLEY YEO & WING-CHEONG CHAN, CODIFICATION, MACAULAY AND THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE: THE LEGACIES AND MODERN CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL LAW
REFORM 2 (2013).
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procedure. Nevertheless, the Pakistani experience does produce a
particular variation worth stressing—Pakistan is distinguished from many
of its post-colonial counterparts in that, after independence, it underwent a
heartfelt attempt to radically restructure its legal system in order to create
an Islamic instead of British system. Unlike the DRC, which maintained
its colonial criminal law inheritance at various points of recodification,
Pakistan actively sought to reconstruct colonial law from the inside out in
order to create an identifiably Pakistani and Islamic legal state.292
The Pakistani Penal Code would therefore appear to give effect to a
criminological policy that is at once markedly distinct from its British
predecessor, and truly representative of an Islamic perspective. Yet, a
closer study of Pakistani criminal offenses confirms a pattern of grafting
Islamic cloaks onto colonial-era laws in ways that likely prove
“unreceptive” for local populations, and more distinctly, end up infecting
other contiguous aspects of the legal system. In this section, we consider
the history of the crime of blasphemy in Pakistan to illustrate this
dynamic. We chose blasphemy because, although it is not an international
crime itself, it personifies attempts to Islamize an originally colonial
doctrine that ultimately results in an inconsistent mix of colonial and
Islamic legal concepts that do not co-exist amicably,293 substantiating
Günter Teubner’s claim that some legal transplants act as “irritants”. As a
result, the history of blasphemy in Pakistan offers a new reason for
reticence toward the idea of treating criminal law doctrine as a proxy for
cultural variation.
On its surface, blasphemy involves provisions that seem to conform
to common understandings of Shari’a punishment, and reflect Pakistan’s
status as an Islamic state with Islamic laws—surely, blasphemy is the
quintessential Islamic offence? Yet the crime is in fact a colonial artifact
that was not a part of Pakistani (or Indian) law until the British colonial
regime imposed the IPC in 1860.294 In 1947, Pakistan was granted
292

General Zia, the military dictator who suspended the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan in
order to properly ‘Islamize’ Pakistan, stated that: “Pakistan, which was created in the
name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider
the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country.” See
ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED, PAKISTAN: ISLAM, POLITICS, AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY 144
(1982).
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Moeen H. Cheema, Beyond Beliefs: Deconstructing the Dominant Narratives of the
Islamization of Pakistan’s Law 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 875, 892 (2012).
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David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 27, 27–28
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autonomy from both India and its erstwhile colonial master, but no
substantial connection was made between the Islamic identity the new
nation adopted soon thereafter and its legal system until the period of
‘Islamization’ that began in the early 1970s.295 Before and since, the
British law of blasphemy has remained the most potent causal force in the
development and maintenance of a crime that has, for worse not better,
become synonymous with Pakistani criminal justice.296
When Pakistani criminal law was finally “Islamized” a generation
after independence,297 this process of internal reform was so haphazard
that, faced with four different Shari’a bills, General Zia ul-Haq simply
295

While General Zia ul-Huq receives much of the attention for his ‘Islamization’
program, the man he executed and then replaced oversaw the implementation of a new
constitution first gave Islam its pre-eminent place in modern-day Pakistan. The 1973
Constitution passed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto explicitly defined Islam as the
national religion (Art. 2); introduced requirements that most national politicians be
Muslim or be compliant with and conversant in Islamic practices (Art. 62); adopted
provisions on following an Islamic Way of Life (Art. 31); and, established a theological
council to advise “on the ‘Islamic’ credentials of existing and proposed law”. See Jeffrey
A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 759, 768–
70 (2004). Bhutto also changed the day of rest from Sunday to Friday, banned alcohol,
took Christian schools out of the control of churches, and ‘acquiesced’ to persecution of
the Ahmadi sect. See Forte, supra note 294, at 36.
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A particularly low point was the mimicry of colonial-era laws that restrained the
ability of non-Muslims to participate in public life. Article 260 of the Bhutto constitution
managed to offer a definition of “Muslim” through its outlawing of the Ahmadi sect. Id.
at 769. This was in keeping with pre-existing repression of Ahmadis – including forcing
them to declare themselves not as Muslims, but to register as Ahmadis on all official
documents – and supplemented by non-state killings of Ahmadis, as well as the state’s
prosecution of Ahmadis for blasphemy violations. See Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Identity
Politics and Minorities in Pakistan (2007) 30:1 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN
STUDIES 111. Besides the application of the blasphemy laws, this criminalization of the
Ahmadis paralleled another British colonial artifact, the Criminal Tribes Act (No. XXVII
of 1871), which required all members of certain communities to register with the
authorities, who then restricted their movements and imprisoned those who left
authorized areas. See K.M. Kapadia, The Criminal Tribes of India (1952) 1:2
SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN 99, 99–100. On the inherent Orientalism of the Criminal Tribes
Act, and the colonial attempt to impose a particular moral order, see Sanjay Nigham,
Disciplining and policing the ‘criminals by birth’, Part 1: The making of a colonial
stereotype—The criminal tribes and castes of North India, (1990) 27:2 THE INDIAN
ECON. AND SOCIAL HIST. REV. 131, 132–134.
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The quality of this reform was dubious given the lack of competence at both the
judicial and legislative levels. See Abdul Ghafur Muslim, Islamization of Laws in
Pakistan: Problems and Prospects, 26 ISLAMIC STUD. 265, 265–66 (1987). This
incompetence combined with the haste with which the process was undertaken led to
“jurisdictional and doctrinal incoherence” throughout the legal system. Osama Siddique
& Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L
L. 303, 319 (2008).
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dismissed the government and introduced his own bill.298 The irregularity
of this extra-constitutional legislation was exacerbated by the
establishment of an additional Islamic judicial system that ran in parallel
to the preexisting one.299 The inevitable result was a lack of jurisdictional
clarity throughout the judicial system,300 as the High Court and Shariat
courts sought to undermine one another through competition over cases
and by professing different interpretations of Islamized laws.301 This
contest over religious fidelity was part of a broader confusion over what it
meant to even have an ”Islamic” law. As one expert has argued, “the
partisans of the Shari’a…are arguing for the dominance of a particular
version of Islam, a version that never existed”.302
In the absence of a clear consensus on the content or propriety of
Islamization, the process has slowed. While some religious parties have
managed to implement particular visions of Shari’a at the local level, they
have found it difficult to impose their vision of Islam on the national
Pakistani legal system.303 Secular parties have resisted further
Islamization, and even post-Zia dictators have countered some of the
excesses of Islamization through separate legislation.304 The net effect is
that, at best, the Islamized blasphemy laws merely painted a veneer of
Islam over the pre-existing colonial system,305 thereby creating a legal
298

Charles Kennedy, Repugnancy to Islam: Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in
Pakistan, 41 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 769, 776–77 (1992).
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See Juris Pupcenoks, Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: Lessons for
the Post-Arab Spring Muslim World, 66 THE MIDDLE EAST J. 273, 278–81 (2012)
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See Cheema, supra note 293, at 885 (noting the passage of bills that sought to ‘deIslamize’ Pakistani criminal law).
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RUBYA MEHDI, THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN 33 (Routledge 2013)
(1994) (“However, Islamization has not made any qualitative change; all the features of
Anglo-Muhammadan law are still there”). With respect to the penal code in general, the
Federal Sharia Court noted that British law and Pakistani-Islamic law were largely
compatible: In one of its first decisions, the Federal Shariat Court explained the basic
concept of Islamization:
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regime governing criminal law that is marked by important internal
contradictions; Pakistani criminal law remains deeply incoherent when
viewed alternatively as either a body of criminal or Islamic law.306
With respect to pre-existing, colonial-era blasphemy laws in
particular, these were neither abandoned nor rewritten with either system
in mind. Instead, they were simply supplemented by additional
prohibitions. Crucially, these supplemental prohibitions undermined what
appeared to be otherwise unbiased colonial law. The British included
blasphemy as an offence in order to reduce inter-religious tension in prePartition India, and preserve a religiously pluralist society that included
Hindus, Muslims, Jains, Sikhs, Parsis and Buddhists, whereas the
‘Islamization’ of those laws instrumentalized them as tools to elevate and
protect Muslim sensibilities alone.307 Now, these laws are used to incite
discrimination and attacks against minorities, or to settle private disputes
between individuals.308
This is not to say that the Indian Penal Code was preferable. Just as
colonial administrators imposed the IPC throughout the world without
local consultation, the post-independence imposition of such strict
provisions bypassed an important and ongoing debate about the nature of
Islam in Pakistan. As a result, the revised blasphemy laws are “not the
product of a pluralistic and participatory democratic discourse”, leaving
their “genesis and ethos… highly tainted.”309 In short, while the military
dictatorship of Zia gave the modern Pakistani crime of blasphemy its
current form, it employed colonial-era laws and anti-populist modes of
implementing Islamization. Consequently, the resulting doctrine offers
only a distorted image of cultural values that cannot be linked to
widespread or uniform societal attitudes with any degree of confidence.
Unfortunately, all of this flies beneath the radar where international courts
Abu Hanifa. A fortiori these laws must be more in harmony with Shariah. In
some respects the statute law may not fulfill the standard of the law of the
Qur'an and may also be repugnant to it but such instances are few.
Muhammed Riaz v. Federal Government, PLD 1980 FSC at 16, quoted in Daniel P.
Collins, Islamization of Pakistani Law: A Historical Perspective, 24 STAN. J. INT’L L.
511, 572 (1988).
306
Tahir Wasti writes that the introduction of Shari’a law in Pakistan led to “numerous
contradictions”; that Islamization was motivated by “political expediency”; and that “the
new law has encouraged criminal homicide and murder.” TAHIR WASTI, THE
APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW IN PAKISTAN: SHARIA IN PRACTICE 283 (2009).
See also Butti Sultan Butt Ali Al-Muhairi, The Islamisation of Laws in the UAE: The
Case of the Penal Code, 11 ARAB L.Q. 350, 351 (1996) (noting that Islamization
programmes create internal contradictions in Shari’a jurisprudence).
307
Siddique & Hayat, supra note 297, 337–39.
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use Pakistani law to bolster ICL’s depiction of itself as truly
universal/cosmopolitan, or when Legal Pluralists call for legal
managerialism without engaging the misalignment between criminal law
doctrine and social, cultural, or political values throughout much of the
modern world.
Instead of reflecting a transformational shift towards a
fundamentally new legal system, the Islamized penal laws of Pakistan are
distressingly familiar: “The rhetoric is all Islamic, but the reality is not
very different from prior practice.”310 The new blasphemy laws used
religious piety to mask antiquated forms of colonial governance;311 rather
than representing a departure from colonialism, they arguably distorted
and then entrenched a variety of unwelcome foreign imports.312 The
310

Collins, supra note 305, at 581. Other aspects of Pakistani criminal law are similarly
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See Charles Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood
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See, e.g., Forte, supra note 294, at 49–50, 53–59 and 63–65 (describing how
blasphemy laws have been used primarily to repress minorities); OMAR NOMAN, THE
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dictator who claimed religious legitimacy by drawing parallels between himself and the
Prophet Muhammad). It has been further argued that the Islamization process itself was
not undertaken to add any doctrinal clarity but to consolidate Zia’s power. See AYESHA
JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DEFENCE 324 (1990) (“Quite clearly, Zia’s state sponsored ‘Islamisation’
programme cannot be seen as anything more than a token effort, and a highly spurious
one at that, to establish his own legitimacy without having to court mass popular
support”); ASMA JAHANGIR & HINA JILANI, THE HUDOOD ORDINANCES: A DIVINE
SANCTION? 21 (2003) (“It is widely accepted that President Ziaul Haq had used Islam as
an instrument to consolidate his power. It was not a matter of genuine concern with
him”); and, Kennedy, supra note 298, at 776 (1992) (noting that opposition claimed
Sharia legislation was designed “to bolster the fading legitimacy of an unpopular
regime”).
312
Three particular cultural imports stand out: (1) British imperialism; (2) a Hinduderived caste system (which prioritizes private enforcement of the law; see Forte, supra
note 294, at 56); and, (3) a particularly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam exported by
wealthy Arab oil states. See KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT –
WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS 79–81 (2005) (in discussing the influence of
Arab Wahhabism in Pakistan, he argues that “Ultimately, Mawdudi and his followers, as
well as the Wahhabis, shared in the belief in a dictatorial theocratic state that forces
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nature of these refined colonial-era laws—internally inconsistent, and of
contested provenance or value to the local population—undermine any
claim to pluralism beyond the superficial. Absent wholesale reform, even
the injection of a system as apparently distinct as Islamic law could not
provide a way out from the impositions of colonial criminal law in
Pakistan. Thus, in this and analogous situations, doctrinal pluralism
appears to offer little guaranteed diversity that international criminal
lawyers can bank on.
B.

Colonialism and Apartheid in the ICC Statute

On its face, a treaty that all states helped negotiate offers a potential
cure for the one-sidedness of previous stages in the development of ICL.
And yet, appearances often deceive—while the ICC Statute did mark a
break from earlier methodologies, several aspects of the international
crimes the Statute adopts are still disquieting for the legal pluralist
prepared to look behind doctrine. Some of these culturally biased
international crimes are highly conspicuous from the language in the ICC
Statute itself, like the decision to define the war crime of pillage as
“pillaging a town or place even when taken by assault,”313 which deferred
to European histories of siege warfare over the widespread experience of
plunder in the Global South.314 In this section, however, we review the

people to comply with their puritanical version of Islamic law”); IRA LAPIDUS, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES, 646 (2d ed. 2002) (“As Pakistan became increasingly
dependent on oil-rich Arab states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor, Bhutto
made further concessions to Islamic morality such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling”).
313
ICC Statute, Arts 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(b)(e)(v).
314
The term ‘pillaging a town and place even when taken by assault’ derives verbatim
from Art. 28 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. The reference to “even when taken by
assault,” is reflective of a period of European history when it was lawful to pillage a town
as retribution for local resistance to siege. See N. BENTWORTH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN WAR 8 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1907. The Brussels Declaration of
1864 elected to do away with even the exception by prohibiting pillage categorically,
hence the language “even when taken by assault.” The Hague Regulations of 1907 then
adopted this same language from the Brussels Declaration. That the ICC Statute chose to
adopt it too speaks to a failure to consider the substance of war crimes or the realities of
modern warfare outside a European mindset, which is particularly disappointing when
Art. 47 of the same Hague Regulations also stipulates that ‘pillage is formally forbidden’.
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV) of 1907].
As things stand, the reference to town, place and assault within the definition is legally
redundant, and historically passé, serving to only obfuscate the legal relevance of pillage
to Third World contexts. For literatures on this phenomenon, see EDUARDO GALEANO,
OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT (25
Anv edition ed. 1997); PIERRE JALÉE, THE PILLAGE OF THE THIRD WORLD (1968). Here,
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pivotal work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) in the
development of substantive ICL crimes for the ICC Statute, focusing
particularly on the moment when a broader understanding of international
crimes seemed possible, only to be discarded soon after in favor of the
status quo ante. Though we might have hoped that the process of
developing a global court would affirm the importance of value pluralism,
we again point to greater historical continuity than rupture with all that
came before. In the end, the work of the ILC on the identification and
definition of international crimes represents a continuation of the sorts of
historical pressures that so seriously upset the relationship between
criminal law doctrine and ideas of social justice almost everywhere.
Indeed, whereas the Islamization of blasphemy became a legal irritant in
Pakistan, it may be reasonable to think that colonialism and apartheid
were rejected during the ICC negotiations because they threatened to
become irritants for Western powers.
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
requesting the then nascent ILC to “(a) formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and
in the Judgment of the Tribunal; (b) prepare a draft code of offences
against the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to
be accorded to the principles mentioned in (a).”315 Over what many lament
as several “tortuous” decades,316 the ILC’s work was divided and then
divided again, with the effect of forestalling the arrival of the ICL
announced at Leipzig, Nuremberg and Tokyo on the doorsteps of Great
Powers. Apparently, it was a surprise to no one that despite encouraging
U.N. General Assembly resolutions and the flurry of activity it generated,
the ILC produced little output over even the medium-term. As Cherif
Bassiouni has argued, the ILC process was chiefly born of the desire to
avoid the charge of hypocrisy: “the powers that had established the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals only a few years earlier could not make a
complete about-face [on ICL] in such a short period of time without losing
face and credibility.” 317
As it happened, the work of the ILC was inhibited from within and
obstructed from without. By 1953, the ILC had delivered the Nuremberg
Principles and a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
and elsewhere, the drafters of the ICC Statute privileged (European) history over
normative coherence and value pluralism.
315
G.A. res 177 (II), 21 November 1947.
316
Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43, 43
(1997).
317
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, 27 ISR. L. REV. 247, 251 (1993).
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Mankind , but as Bassiouni explains, their time “was not yet ripe.”318 In
response, the United Nations established two further parallel processes
that ground these initiatives to a virtual standstill for several decades.
First, the United Nations appointed different Special Rapporteurs charged
with creating a Draft Statute for the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court.319 This parallel process was more counterproductive than
facilitative when the work on the Draft Code was ongoing, contentious
and overlapping in key substantive areas.320 Second, both of these illcoordinated, under-resourced and politically duplicitous initiatives were
placed on ice when a separate working group was established to define the
international crime of aggression. This third process only reached a
conclusion in 1974, by which time the delay sought was well achieved.
In 1981, a full seven years after the aggression impasse was resolved
in the General Assembly, the U.N. General Assembly invited the ILC to
reignite the process of creating a Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. In a rare opening for voices from the
Global South, the ILC appointed Senegalese diplomat and international
lawyer Doudou Thiam as the Special Rapporteur to lead the new drafting
process. Under his direction, the ILC went from very lean times to
something of a “binge”;321 Thiam produced an enormous body of work on
a wide range of topics, including ICL crimes. It is within this work that we
see the sorts of partial political agendas that make doctrinal pluralism
unsafe as a measure of diverse values and interests in the international
community seep into treaty-making. In this instance, they present
themselves within the prehistory to the ICC Statute rather than the
criminal law governing association de malfaiteurs in the DRC, conspiracy
in the Tokyo Tribunal, the Japanese law of complicity, the doctrine of JCE
announced by ad hoc tribunals or the British/Pakistani crime of
blasphemy. Rather than defining cross-cultural standards of the sort
Mullins had called for at Leipzig, the norms developed at the ICC would
not escape the power dynamics that infuse criminal law everywhere.
At first, Thiam’s advice very much reflected a plural perspective on
ICL. In 1991, the first draft code he tabled included the familiar crimes
derived from Leipzig then Nuremberg, like aggression, genocide,
“systematic or mass violations of human rights” (read crimes against
humanity), and “exceptionally serious war crimes.” At the same time, this
318

Id.
Id. at 250–251.
320
Id.
321
The term is attributed to an ILC member, but Rayfuse employs the eating disorder
metaphor to describe the initial under-consumption then over-consumption of the ILC on
this topic. See Rayfuse, supra note 316, at 47.
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first draft also included a supplemental set of crimes that were more
sensitive to the histories we have reviewed. These brand new,
supplemental offences included “colonial domination and other forms of
alien domination”; “apartheid”; and “recruitment, use, financing, and
training of mercenaries.”322 Clearly, this revised set of crimes flowed from
Thiam’s pluralist appreciation of global values. Rather than accept as a
fait accompli that the only crimes to be considered international crimes
were those that had been prosecuted over the past century, Thiam saw
value in attempting to develop a more representative understanding of
what constituted an international crime. Thus, unconvinced that the list of
international crimes was closed post-Nuremberg, and unsatisfied by the
tautologies of existing approaches that did not specify what made an
international crime an international crime,323 Thiam and the ILC he lead
set about developing a coherent theory of international criminalization. In
particular, the ILC began considering the criteria that international crimes
shared, instead of simply adopting the closed list of existing crimes that
deferred to history over principle. Ultimately, the ILC proposed a standard
of ‘extreme seriousness’ to define the international crimes it espoused.324
While not crystal clear, this touchstone did act as a decent platform for
criminalizing additional conduct without abandoning any crimes from the
existing corpus.
Whether coherent or not, Thiam’s reengineering met with staunch
resistance from the outset. Some states preferred the list approach that
remained true to Nuremberg; still others tried to identify international
crimes in relation to what they believed to be the appropriate penalty for
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From his very first report on the draft code, Thiam gestured at the emergence and
importance of new crimes like colonial domination. Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur),
First Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/364 (Mar. 18, 1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n, 137 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Thiam, First
Report] (drawing inspiration from the ILC’s work on state responsibility at the time,
which had included similar notions). It was not until his third report, released in April
1985, that Thiam explicitly listed colonial domination and other colonialism-type
offenses within his code. See Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ¶¶ 157–162, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/387 (Apr. 8, 1985, reprinted in [1985] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 63, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Thiam, Third Report]. Note that
this list also included “Economic Aggression.”
323
First Report, supra note 322, at ¶ 55 (“[M]erely listing criminal acts without relating
them to a common principle does not appear to be satisfactory.”)
324
Martin Ortega, The ILC Adopts the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 283, 296–97 (1997).
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their commission.325 Despite these different resistant strategies, the ILC
pushed forward with its progressive position, assessing every possible
international crime that it could find using its threshold test. The sources it
looked to included the Nuremberg Charter, the 1954 Draft Code, and
every international agreement that might have suggested an international
crime thereafter.326 Over time, ‘extreme seriousness’ was refined,327 but it
still allowed the ILC to expand beyond the Nuremberg list and identify a
total of twelve international crimes.328 On paper, the new draft was an
attempt to reconcile criminal law doctrine with the diversity of social
values throughout the world, in part by criminalizing the political practice
that had produced such a deep schism between them throughout global
law.
This expansive approach to ICL crimes was quickly shut down in
the face of objections from Western states. The states concerned –
including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium and the
Netherlands – offered only flimsy rationales for their political stances.329
Apartheid and colonialism, for example, were not crimes but political
novelties that had ceased to exist by that point, so there was no reason to
criminalize them now.330 These Western states did not want to consider
325

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Thirty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
A/40/10, ¶¶ 65–67; 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 (1985), reprinted in [1985] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n, 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (Part 2).
326
Special Rapporteur on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, Second Rep. on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, ¶ 13, UN Doc. A/CN.4/377, (Feb. 1, 1984) (by Doudou Thiam), reprinted in
[1984] II(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 89, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 1).
[hereinafter Second Report].
327
Id. ¶ 8; Thiam, Third Report, supra note 322, ¶ 49; Doudou Thiam (Special
Rapporteur), Fifth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (Mar. 17, 1987), reprinted in [1987] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 1); Int’l Law Comm’n, supra
note 325, ¶ 69.
328
Including: aggression, the threat of aggression, interference, terrorism, violation of
treaties concerning the maintenance of peace, violation of treaties prohibiting the
deployment or testing of weapons, colonial domination, mercenarism, genocide,
apartheid, inhuman acts, and breaches of serious obligations to preserve the human
environment. See Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on the Draft Code
of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (Mar.
11, 1986), reprinted in [1986] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 83–86, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 1).
329
Ortega, supra note 324, at 302 (stating that the non-Nuremberg crimes were
abandoned “without convincing justification”).
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In its comment on apartheid, the United Kingdom, for example, claimed that the ILC
needed to “fundamentally reconsider this article in the light of changed international
circumstances.” The crime of colonialism was described as “of another era”. Comments
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whether the prohibited conduct actually satisfied the seriousness criteria
developed by the ILC – they simply wanted them deleted.331 To no avail,
Thiam argued very reasonably that the present absence of certain conduct
did not foreclose the possibility of future conduct, which would then
demand criminal punishment.332 Yet his arguments fell on deaf ears;
Thiam was sent back to trim the unwelcome additions from his overly
ambitious draft. When he later reflected on the slimmer version Western
states found more tolerable, Thiam regretted the “mutilated draft” that was
forced upon him but acknowledged that without bowing to the (Western)
political agenda, he risked “reducing the draft Code to a mere exercise in
style, with no chance of becoming an applicable instrument.”333
This, perhaps more than any other moment, reveals one-sidedness at
the ICC’s point of design, where political power operated to extinguish
alternative agendas, interests and priorities rather than embracing an
inclusive Statute that recognized the multiple ways in which serious
international crimes could be inflicted. In particular, it excised criminal
offenses European states had inflicted but not suffered.334 Analytically, the
failure created a deep anomaly. The only radical consequence of
describing colonialism as an international crime in the late 1990s is that it
might implicate a number of states in ongoing crimes; but that would be a
principled argument in favour of defining colonialism as a crime, rather
than not defining it as such. Similarly, on what principle could states
refuse to identify apartheid as an international crime? That these Western
states had refused to ratify the Apartheid Convention in 1976 was
surprising; that they refused to criminalize apartheid even after the fall of
the South African regime is outright perplexing.335 Claiming that South
African apartheid was singularly horrific hardly seems a position from
and observations received from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/448 and Add. 1 (1
March 1993), Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION, Vol. II, Pt. 1, at 101.
331
Id. at 59ff.
332
Special Rapporteur on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, Thirteenth Report on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, ¶ 13 – 15 UN Doc. A/CN.4/466 (Mar. 24, 1995) (by Doudou
Thiam), reprinted in [1995] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 33, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1995/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Thirteenth Report].
333
Id. at ¶ 3.
334
Aimé Césaire, among others, has suggested that Nazi crimes in WWII often amounted
to colonial crimes, while also pointing out the discrepancy with the non-prosecution of
prior Western colonial crimes. AIMÉ CÉSAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM 36 (Joan
Pinkham trans., Monthly Review Press, 2000) (1955). This is not to say that only
Western states were capable of colonial crimes.
335
To this day, a number of major Western states – including the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy – have yet to ratify the
Apartheid Convention.
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which one would want to argue that apartheid should not be criminalized;
if anything, the opposite would be true.
Lacking the support of powerful Western states, Thiam was
compelled to submit the ‘mutilated’ draft to the United Nations General
Assembly. In 1996, this draft contained “institutionalized racial
discrimination”, and while Thiam described it as “the crime of apartheid
in a more general denomination”,336 it had little effect since preparations
for the ICC Statute had already started based on an earlier ILC draft Code
that did not include any apartheid-type crime. That apartheid eventually
made it into the final ICC Statute was the result of lobbying by Mexico,
Ireland, and a group of African states including South Africa.337 Yet the
Rome Statute definition of apartheid as a crime is both ambiguous and
contains an important dissonance with both the Apartheid Convention and
the Draft Code Thiam had originally favored. Unlike its predecessors, the
Rome Statute requires that apartheid take place in the context of a
widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population.338
According to Paul Eden, the scope of apartheid is even narrower than in
those documents, being “limited to a residual category of acts not falling
within the ambit of persecution”339 and thus excluding a range of conduct
characteristic of apartheid.340 Similarly, Tim McCormack notes that the
336

Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th Sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, p. 49, UN Doc.
A/51/10; U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996).
337
Mexico and Ireland first raised the issue during the Rome Conference. United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
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intent requirement for apartheid in the Rome Statute was included at the
insistence of the United States, who was fearful that it would criminalize
domestic white supremacist organizations.341 So, if Mahmood Mamdani is
correct that in history “apartheid, usually considered unique to South
Africa, is actually the generic form of the colonial state in Africa,”342 ICC
negotiations dropped colonialism as a crime and defined apartheid to
disprove his thesis.
When coupled with the continued absence of the crime of
colonialism, Eden’s description of apartheid as ‘progressive
development’343 suggests that the obstructionism of the 1990s was
partially overcome at the Rome Conference. While this is obviously true
in part in that the negotiations produced some criminal law doctrine where
there was none before, it is difficult not to come away from this
negotiation with the sense that the same dynamics that so colored criminal
law throughout the world are also alive and well in the ICC too. It may
even be fair to surmise that colonialism and a farther-reaching concept of
apartheid were not enshrined as international law because they risked
becoming “legal irritants” for Western states, replicating blasphemy in
Pakistan in reverse. Whatever the case, the ILCs definitions of ICL crimes
point to the privileging of Western preferences. Thus, this scenario
signifies another instance where the forces that skewed the relationship
between criminal law doctrine and local values in much of the world, also
shaped criminal law at the international level. So to the extent that Legal
Pluralism accepts the constellation of diverse global law that arose
through this history, we worry that this approach cedes too much ground
too quickly if a plurality of values and interests are our core normative
aspirations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to contribute to a discourse on Global
Legal Pluralism, using ICL as an illustration. The implications of the
histories we revisit here are significant for both fields.
For Global Legal Pluralism, the foregoing substantiates de Sousa
Santos’ argument, set out in the epigraph to this Article, that “there is
341
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nothing inherently good, progressive, or emancipatory about legal
pluralism.”344 With de Sousa Santos, we insist on the word “inherently.”
No doubt, criminal law doctrine frequently reflects diverse social and
cultural values, which a cosmopolitan vision of global law will rightly
venerate, but we have drawn on a range of different components of the
criminal law, histories of colonialism by various European powers, and a
variegated set of distortions in situ to demonstrate that the relation
between doctrine and social value is far from invariable. Consequently,
once legal pluralism moves away from its purely descriptive origins to
make any normative claim about how to respond to the diversity of legal
standards available internationally, it risks honoring laws that are born of
force, that may not enjoy any meaningful degree of popular support, or
that symbolize a painful history of subjugation to be overcome.
Universalism may therefore prove a superior guarantor of (value)
pluralism than respect for existing doctrinal arrangements in certain
circumstances, although this will be case-sensitive since as the ICC
experience suggests, this too may not escape the dynamics we point to.
Overall, ICL is but a metaphor for a dynamic that will undoubtedly
permeate other areas of law. On a certain level, then, the histories we point
to are a challenge to the new prescriptive style of legal pluralism writ
large.
For ICL, the foregoing suggests that the field is biased in legal
methodology and substance, not just in application. By declining to
engage with this reality, legal pluralism risks tacitly condoning this
normative partiality, thereby making too few demands on a global system
of criminal law (national and international law in dynamic interaction) that
remains tainted in the various ways we point to: criminal doctrine is
sometimes part of the problem ICL exists to counteract, may be
transplanted from afar in ways that prove “unreceptive” in the recipient
society, and can operate as a legal irritant that contaminates adjacent
concepts. Thus even though legal pluralists might argue that we have
unfairly targeted a particularly shallow vision of pluralism in ICL, our
underlying concern remains that even a more rigorous legal pluralism is
still unable to: (a) excise these deeply problematic legacies from the law it
embraces; (b) determine the proper role for norms born of these ugly
histories in a plural account of ICL; (c) adjudicate between legal and nonlegal norms the field should draw on; or (d) defend a prescriptive version
of legal pluralism in absolute terms. Consequently, once laid bare, the
histories we have unveiled open up space for the idea of pluralism by
unification; it is at least conceivable that in certain areas, a universal
concept of ICL might better guarantee (value) pluralism than managing
344
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the set of laws governing criminal law at international or national levels
presently.345 Conceivably, George Fletcher may be right that “resolutions
on the surface of the law should not obscure the unity that underlies
apparently diverse legal cultures.”346 As these histories show, however,
one would have to tread carefully in assessing whether any given norm
meets this mark to avoid power again masquerading as unity.
At the level of enforcement, these stories also reveal that the
institutions capable of enforcing ICL norms should explore ways of at
least partially correcting for these flaws, provided recipient societies see
this as a desirable course of action. In fact, doing so may amount to a
collective responsibility; a concept we scholars of ICL often impose on
others. In her remarkable study of the effects of the Tokyo Trials in Japan,
Madoka Futamura interviewed a Japanese man in his late thirties, who
pointed out that he still felt a sense of responsibility for Japanese wartime
atrocities even though he was not yet born when they transpired: “I as a
Japanese person shoulder an historical responsibility… I do not want to
shoulder such a thing. But I cannot help it because I cannot stop being
Japanese, and I should shoulder it. But it is unpleasant. What have our
ancestors done!”347 The Europeans who populate courts and tribunals
(international and domestic) shoulder a different burden for colonialism,
but it should register with a similar intensity. Although one cannot be too
politically naïve about the possibility of counteracting this past,348 the
challenge lies in asserting, jointly, that our futures will not be like our
pasts.
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